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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the development of the duty to bargain and its good faith 
component in the collective bargaining regime primarily in South Africa and from a 
comparative perspective in Lesotho and Canada. The dissertation focuses on the role 
played by legislation and the judiciary in the development of a 'duty to bargain' 
jurisprudence in the three jurisdictions and the enforceability of good faith bargaining. 
In South Africa the Constitution 1996 has entrenched the . right to engage in collective 
bargaining in tenns of section 23(5), amongst other labour rights. The Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) does not include an express duty to bargain much less impose a 
duty to bargain in good faith. This omission has given rise to a debate on whether or not 
this omission is unconstitutional in light of section 23(5). 
This dissertation therefore examines the various arguments made in favour of or against a 
statutorily imposed duty to bargain, which necessarily implies good faith bargaining, in 
the context of a voluntaristic system of collective bargaining. 
Lesotho and Canada are utilized as examples of countries which have a statutorily 
imposed duty to bargain on employers with representative trade unions. 
The dissertation attempts to avoid a purely legalistic approach in favour of an analysis 
that takes into account the socio-economic context within which collective bargaining 
takes place. 
The proposition in the dissertation is that a voluntaristic system of collective bargaining is 
not incompatible with the imposition of a statutorily imposed duty to bargain, provided a 
clear distinction between process and product is maintained. In the South African 
context, despite criticisms of constitutional ising labour rights, I argue that the omission of 
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Chapter One 
Objectives, Methodology, Limitations and Justification for the Study 
1. Objectives 
1.1 Chapter One 
The objective of this chapter is to outline the objectives, methodology, 
limitations and justifications of the 6 chapters of the dissertation. This outline 
will be done chapter by chapter. Each chapter has a conclusion section 
however the final chapter, that is to say, Chapter 6 shall contain a conclusion 
of the whole dissertation. 
1.2 Chapter Two 
The objective of chapter two is to provide a theoretical perspective on 
industrial relations and the normative context within which collective 
bargaining takes place. A suggestion is made that the dominant theory in any 
country or jurisdiction is the result of a conscious decision on how the actors 
of collective bargaining should interact and the role that the state plays to 
regUlate this interaction. This chapter also seeks to illustrate the fact that the 
extent and nature of the state's intervention in collective bargaining is by no 
means a clear-cut one hence the controversial duty to bargain debate in South 
Africa. 
1.3 Chapter Three 
This chapter examines the historical development of collective bargaining and 
the duty to bargain and its good faith component in South Africa, Lesotho and 
Canada and the obvious role played by legislative enactments in this 
development. The chapter seeks to highlight in particular the role of the old 
Industrial Relations Court in South Africa in developing duty to bargain in 
good faith jurisprudence despite minimal legislative guidance. 
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1.4 Chapter Four 
This chapter seeks to interrogate the efficacy of the international and regional 
labour law framework and whether this has any implications for the 
development of the duty to bargain and in good faith at the national level. The 
suggestion made is that this regime of international and regional labour law 
appears to serve as a general guide to the legislative framework, which seeks 
to establish certain basic norms while leaving the detailed provisions to 
national legislatures. 
1.5 Chapter Five 
This chapter seeks to provide a comparative analysis of the national labour law 
frameworks in the three jurisdictions pertaining to collective bargaining and 
the duty to bargain and its good faith aspect. Case law wiII also be included 
and discussed where available. 
1.6 Chapter Six 
This chapter concludes the discussion on collective bargaining and the general 
duty to bargain and its good faith element in South Africa, Canada and 
Lesotho. A brief analysis of the findings of the dissertation and 
recommendations will also be provided. 
2. Methodology 
The methodology utilised throughout the dissertation is basically library 
research. Heavy reliance has been placed on sources such as law journals, 
textbooks on labour law and primary sources such as legislation. Minimal use 
has been made of the Internet but where the actual materials were not readily 
available, such as in the case of Canada, reputable websites were referred to. 
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3. Limitations of the Study 
The issue of a general duty to bargain and its good faith component has been 
fairly extensively researched in South Africa while in Lesotho it has not. The 
dissertation is therefore limited in tenns of academic analysis of collective 
bargaining and the general duty to bargain particularly in Lesotho. In tenns of 
Canada the limitations were the unavailability of a wider variety of written 
materials on collective bargaining and the duty to bargain. The primary 
sources, that is, the legislation governing collective bargaining in Canada were 
therefore indispensable and readily available on the Internet. The writer in 
addition consulted secondary sources, that is, textbooks on Canadian labour 
law with chapters on collective bargaining and articles written on collective 
bargaining. 
4. Justification for the Study 
The duty to bargain debate in South Africa fonns a substantial basis of this 
study however the writer has adopted a comparative perspective to analyse the 
current collective bargaining framework. There are various reasons for having 
chosen Lesotho and Canada to compare to South Africa in this dissertation. 
The writer chose Lesotho to fORTI part of the study due to the fact that there is 
a paucity of written literature and research on collective bargaining, despite the 
existence of a legislative and policy framework. The writer humbly intends for 
this dissertation to make a small contribution towards the development of 
research in this area of the labour law. The Lesotho legal system and the nonns 
infonning the development of its jurisprudence have always been informed by 
the developments in South Africa mainly due to its geographical location. The 
development of the duty to bargain in good faith in the Lesotho labour law 
should therefore be compared and contrasted with the developments of the 
labour law in South Africa particularly after the advent of democracy. 
4 
Canada has been chosen as part of this study due to the fact that in developing 
its labour law in particular, South Africa had to 'borrow and bend'\ largely 
from Canadian labour law and jurisprudence. This process occurred in the late 
eighties and early nineties during the heyday of the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. 
I This term is associated with Clive Thompson who has written extensively on collective bargaining in South 
Africa. 
Chapter Two 
2. Theoretical Framework of Industrial Relations and Collective Bargaining 
In this chapter I will provide an overview of industrial relations theory as it 
relates to collective bargaining. The examination of these theories and 
perspectives enables us to identify the various processes and dynamics 
occurring within the environment in which collective bargaining takes place. I 
will also present a brief exposition of these theoretical perspectives in terms of 
the implications that they have for collective bargaining. In this regard, I will 
focus on the role of the state and the types of interventions that the state can 
make in terms of institutionalising collective bargaining. 
2.1 The Industrial Relations Tbeoretical Framework 
There is a diverse array of industrial relations theories. Grossett suggests that 
the major ones are Unitarism, Pluralism and Marxism or the Radical 
perspective. I Swanepoel adds to this list Corporatism which is divided into 
State Corporatism and Societal Corporatism? 
The Unitarist theory de-emphasises the role of unions in the workplace and 
contends that collective bargaining interferes with market forces.3 In addition, 
the Unitarist theory is considered to be largely irrelevant to contemporary 
discussion of industrial relations in a democratic setting and has been 
dismissed as 'incongruent with reality and useless for purposes of analysis.'4 
The relevance of the Unitarist theory to this paper is therefore limited as 'with 
the rise of trade unionism ... the unitary approach was gradually eroded.'5 One 
can safely deduce that Unitarism does not inform the industrial relations 
systems of the three countries under consideration in the dissertation. 
I Grossett, M. ' Labour Relations in South Africa' 7 
2 Swanepoel, BJ. 'South African Employment Relations in Context' in 'Managing Employment Relations in 
South Africa' 1-10 
3 Finnemore, M. 'Introduction to Labour Relations in South Africa' 13 
4 ibid, 5 
S Bendix, S. 'Industrial Relations in South Africa' 21 
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In terms of the Pluralist theory, employers and employees have conflicting 
goals and values but acknowledge their interdependence.6 . This therefore 
implies that conflict should be managed within mutually agreed procedures 
and structures.? To this end, collective bargaining is a voluntary, usually 
decentralised process underpinned by the right to strike.8 
Some of the most important elements underpinning the pluralist perspective 
are: freedom of association, the right to strike and lock out, and 
institutionalised power play and collective bargaining.9 In addition, Pluralist 
societies presuppose a wealth base that is perceived as sufficiently fairly 
distributed for the stakeholders to have an interest in maintaining rather than 
disrupting it. IO 
The pluralist theory is recognised as the best approach to accommodate the 
interests of the working class within a capitalistic economic system. I I The 
pluralist theory also recognizes that the interactions between management and 
labour are defined by unequal bargaining power, with an 'equilibrium' that is 
never constant and determined by factors outside the parties' control.12 
The pluralist theory is more widely accepted and reflected in current 
organisational and societal patterns than any other theory.13 
The Marxist theory or the radical perspective on the other hand 'promotes an 
order in which productive capacity (including land, capital, and labour) and the 
fruits thereof are owned by and shared among the people.'14 





II Bendix, op. cit. 22 
12 Rycroft, A. and Jordan, B. 'A Guide to South African Labour Law' 121 
13 Grossett, M. op. cit. 7 
14 ibid, 8 
IS ibid 
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The traditional notion of collective bargaining therefore does not accord well 
with the basic tenets of Marxist theory because 'there is no division of labour 
[and] people work for the sake of working and not for what they stand to gain 
in retum,15 
In terms of this theory, 'collective bargaining is viewed as an employer 
strategy whereby the trade union is co-opted into the capitalist system.'16 
It is trite that Marxism or Radicalism as a theory and in practice has been 
highly compromised by the fall of the Soviet Union and its allies in Eastern 
Europe. The efficacy of the Marxist theory in terms of analysing collective 
bargaining and its institutionalisation is therefore minimal. 
In terms of State Corporatism on the other hand, trade unions are demobilised 
and co-opted into government structures. 17 It is patent that where State 
Corporatism forms part of state policy in a particular state, collective 
bargaining and other trade union rights will not be recognised. Societal 
Corporatism recognises the autonomy of trade unions and their right to engage 
in industrial action. ls This theory attempts to accommodate the interests of all 
the actors of industrial relations and achieve 'social consensus' for the benefit 
of a sound and predictable economy. 19 
One can therefore conclude that societal corporatism can in effect promote 
collective bargaining while simultaneously avoiding measures of compulsion 
that would give rise to the perception that a particular group whether employer 
or trade union is being compromised. Achieving consensus among the various 
actors of collective bargaining on any issue of economic or labour policy is 
obviously the first prize however this is seldom the case in practice. 
16 Swanepoel, op. cit. 1-10 
17 ibid 
IS Swanepoel, op. cit. I-II 
19 ibid 
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As will be illustrated in the subsequent chapters of the dissertation,the South 
African industrial relations system in particular and the legislative framework 
underpinning it are the product of a delicate consensus. Ten years after the 
adoption of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA) some actors of the 
collective bargaining system are beginning to show signs of discontent with 
some provisions of the LRA as either favouring trade unions or employers to 
the detriment of the interests of the other. The issue of a statutory general duty 
to bargain and the debates surrounding it should therefore be examined in this 
context. 
2.2 The Role of Law in Collective Bargaining 
There are two principal ways in which the state can regulate collective 
bargaining that is via the legislature and the judiciary whose function it is to 
interpret and enforce the legislation. 
Sidney and Beatrice Webb first defined collective bargaining in the 19th 
century in their classical work, Industrial Democracy, as a rational strategy for 
dealing with problems of unequal bargaining power between workers and 
employers.2o Recently collective bargaining has been commonly defined as a 
voluntary method or system that regulates the bilateral control of workplace . 
relations between employers and unions.21 Collective bargaining is integral to 
and a 'core' of the industrial relations systems of many democratic, free 
market economies?2 The problem that the Webbs were concerned with 
however, that is, unequal bargaining power still persists even in the 21 SI 
century therefore the efficacy of any collective bargaining regime should be 
assessed in this context. 
20 Kochan, T. 'Collective Bargaining and Industrial Relations' 5 
21 Rycroft, A. and Jordan, B. op. cit. 114 
22 Suwa, Y. 'The Actors of Collective Bargaining' in The Actors of Collective Bargaining: A World Report 23 
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There are two main actors in collective bargaining that is industry and trade 
unions?3 The state through the mechanism of legislation determines the way in 
which the actors interact, the rules and procedures that they utilise to regulate 
their interaction and the institutions through which they interact. The role of 
the state in regulating collective bargaining has been the subject of controversy 
particularly within the regulation vis-a-vis deregulation debate. Academics and 
policy makers however do realise that 'abstention of the law is not always 
possible, nor is it always necessarily the best policy. ,24 
The courts have also been given a role in various aspects of the individual and 
collective aspects of the employment relationship. Rycroft and Jordan describe 
the tensions in this approach succinctly: 'the tension between the non-
interventionist spirit of the pluralist approach and the process of juridification 
is obvious. ,25 
The extent to which the state will interfere in the labour-management 
relationship will depend generally on its adherence to the principle of 
voluntarism on one hand or mandatorism on the other?6 
In addition, the policy choices of the state in terms of whether to adhere to 
mandatorism or voluntarism will be influenced by some of the theoretical 
perspectives outlined above. 
Historically, the term 'voluntarism' has its roots in the British industrial 
relations system whereby both labour and management resisted any 
government interference in industrial relations, 'including a compulsion to 
bargain. ,27 
23 Grandi, M. ibid 
24 Bendix, op. cit. 22 
25 Rycroft and Jordan, op. cit. 122 
26 Bendix, op. cit. 39 
27 Anstey, M. 'Global Shifts in Industrial Relations: Implications for South Africa' 19 
to 
Otto Kahn-Freund is widely credited as the proponent of the voluntarist model 
of industrial relations.28 In this context, labour law operated within the 
framework of 'collective lasseiz- faire' in which the collective forces of labour 
and capital battled it out until the side with the superior social power brought 
the conflict to an end?9 The courts intervened in labour disputes only in so far 
as they fell under the category of 'disputes of right. ,30 
However, the British government has increasingly interfered in industrial 
relations to the extent that 'voluntarism in its original sense no longer 
pertains.'3) This can be attributed to the fact that 'voluntarism' was criticised 
as 'ill-defined and imprecise and could not account for a divergent range of 
British practice and prescription. ,32 
Voluntarism in its theoretical sense insists on minimal or no interference in the 
interactions of labour and management.33 In practice, ' ... absolute or pure 
voluntarism exists nowhere in the world. In so-called voluntary systems there 
are mandatory elements, the degree varying from country to country and, even 
in one country, from government to government or from year to year. ,34 
Most industrial relations systems exhibit elements of both voluntarism and 
mandatorism, however, voluntarism is understood by some commentators to 
apply not so much to a 'duty to bargain' but to the outcomes of bargaining.35 
(emphasis added) 
28 Davis, D. 'Voluntarism and South African Labour law: Are the Queensbury Rules an Anachronism?' 45 
29 ibid, quoting Kahn-freund's 'Labour and the Law' 
30 ibid, 46 
JI ibid 
32 BeardweIl, I. 'Contemporary Industrial Relations: A Critical Analysis' 6 
33 Bendix, op. cit. 39 
34 ibid 
35 Anstey, op. cit. 19 
II 
The crux of voluntarism therefore is that legal intervention is tolerated only in 
so far as it is necessary to ensure the smooth operation of the process of 
collective bargaining so that its outcome can be determined by the relative 
economic strength of the parties.36 
The duty to bargain debate may therefore be seen as a concern with the general 
issue of the location and role of collective bargaining in a market economy.37 
The manner in which any government intervenes in the industrial relations 
system depends on its ideology, its political objectives, the socio-economic 
context and the strength of the trade unions.38 The various organs of the state 
may be utilised to regulate the labour-management relationship particularly in 
terms of collective bargaining. The state may play a legislative role by 
enacting labour legislation and even providing for labour rights in the 
Constitution, which is the approach that has been adopted in South Africa. 
This' constitutionalisation' of labour rights is not without its controversies?9 
The state may also playa role in industrial relations and collective bargaining 
via the judiciary, as it has been noted 'despite its theoretical independence 
from the government, [the judiciary] remains an instrument ofthe state. ,40 
Questions do however arise in terms of the nature and exact role that should be 
played by the courts in collective bargaining particularly in terms of enforcing 
a duty to bargain. Quoting Thompson, Davis reiterates the principle that '[the] 
Court should act as a custodian of the process and absent itself from the 
product of negotiation, which should be a reflection of the dynamic balance of 
power between the parties. ,41 
36 Rycroft, op. cit.126 
37 Beardwell, op. cit. 3 
38 Bendix, op. cit.40 
39 The 'constitutionalisation of labour rights' debate is discussed infra 
40 ibid, 45 
41 Davis, op. cit. 63 
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In practice however, the lines of demarcation between the court's role in 
safeguarding the integrity of the process without imposing outcomes and 
actively intervening in the arena are diffIcult to draw. As will be illustrated in 
the subsequent chapters of the dissertation, in Canada the Labour Relations 
Boards (LRB' s) have in cases of extreme bad faith bargaining crossed the 
delicate line and imposed outcomes or 'Collective agreements on the parties.42 
It is clear that the tension between the role of the courts in a process that is 
theoretically 'free' and statutorily created bargaining structures is a perpetual 
one. 
The advent of the LRA, the constitutional entrenchment of a 'right to engage 
in collective bargaining,43 in the South African Constitution and the decisions 
of the South African High Court in the SANDU and other recent cases neatly 
illustrate this ever present tension.44 
2.3 Conclusion 
One can make several observations a propos the theories governing industrial 
relations systems and by implication the nature of collective bargaining. Some 
of the theories have, in the context of a modem global ising world, lost 
prominence due to advances in democracy in the political sense. The 
increasingly important role oftrade unions in liberation struggles in both South 
Africa and to a lesser degree Lesotho ensured the elevation of their role in 
industrial relations. 
Trade unions, the state and industry are all important players in industrial 
relations and collective bargaining; hence the pluralist theory is most relevant 
in terms of explaining the role of each actor. However some systems exhibit a 
hybrid of theories and perspectives. 
42 Royal Oak Mines v. Labour Relations Board (Canada) 
43 Section 23(5) 
44 Discussed in Chapter 5 
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This 'hybridisation' of theory and perspective has resulted in a disjuncture 
which is reflected in the controversy of whether collective bargaining should 
be compelled or not and what the exact limits of such compulsion would be. In 
terms of pluralism in its pure theoretical sense, collective bargaining is 
'voluntaristic' therefore the notion of compulsion does not arise. This 
absolutism is however not reflected in the current global trend of the 
institutionalisation of collective bargaining and in the role that the judiciary 
plays in enforcing some of the prescriptions surrounding collective bargaining. 
No system can lay claim to being entirely voluntaristic. This in tum gives rise 
to tensions regarding the nature of the role played by the state in this sensitive 
arena. The term 'voluntarism' itself does not appear to negate Some level of 
compulsion but the theoretical or definitional boundaries are not clear. 
Would imposing a duty to bargain offend the voluntaristic perspective of 
collective bargaining in a largely pluralistic industrial relations system? Is a 
duty to bargain therefore capable of exact definition in a sense limiting the role 
of the courts in collective bargaining and do the statutory frameworks in the 
various countries under discussion provide guidance in this regard? 
Clarification and certainty with regard to whether a duty to bargain is 
compatible with collective bargaining in the 21 st century and its constantly 
evolving socio-economic context is absolutely crucial. Certainty in this regard 
would go towards clearly defining the boundaries of state intervention via its 
legislative function and the judiciary. 
Chapter Three 
3. The History of Collective Bargaining in South Africa, Lesotho and 
Canada with Reference to a Duty to Bargain 
It is imperative to examine the historical development of collective bargaining 
and the duty to bargain. It is only through an appreciation of collective 
bargaining and its historical development through legislation and court 
jurisprudence that the utility of the current framework can be rigorously 
evaluated. The historical development approach also assists us to ascertain 
trends in terms of state intervention in collective bargaining and the social 
context in which such intervention becomes imperative. Examining the 
historical development of collective bargaining in the various jurisdictions also 
enables us to discern the labour policy choices adopted by the state to facilitate 
collective bargaining and how these policy choices are dictated to by various 
socio-economic contexts. 
3.1 The Development of the Duty to Bargain in South Africa 
Historically, South Africa had what has been termed a 'dualistic system of 
labour relations,1 a system which was in line with the apartheid policy of 
separate development. Black employees were prevented from joining 
registered trade unions. As far as blacks were concerned their position was 
governed by the Black Labour Relations Regulation Act 48 of 1953 which, 
inter alia, provided for a 'restricted right to strike,2 
In the late 1970's the government set up a Commission of Inquiry into Labour 
Legislation headed by Professsor Wiehahn. This unprecedented move was 
precipitated by growing political tensions caused by the policies of the 
apartheid government and resulted in 'deracialised' labour laws. 
I Grogan, J. 'Collective Labour Law' 3 
2 ibid 
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The Report of the Commission observed that collective bargaining with regard 
to white employees took place at the industry level, through industrial 
councils, while for black workers bargaining was primarily plant based.3 
The Industrial Conciliation Act, later referred to as the Labour Relations Act 
1956 went as far as prescribing the bargaining topics which the industrial 
council could negotiate on with the represented trade union(s) 4 while still 
leaving the parties to decide on other topics to conclude agreements on.5 In a 
nutshell, the LRA 1956, , [was] an interventionist piece of legislation standing 
in sharp contrast to the collective lasseiz faire approach.,6 
Unfortunately, the Wiehahn Commission did not examine the theories and 
ideologies underlying the economic and industrial relations system, as this did 
not form part of its terms of reference. 7 
One of the far-reaching recommendations made by the Wiehahn Commission 
was for the establishment of an Industrial Court which would be given powers 
to interdict 'unfair labour practices.,8 Rycroft notes that the 1986 Draft Bill to 
amend the LRA 1956 did not per se introduce the duty to bargain explicitly, 
instead the unreasonable failure or refusal to negotiate by either employer or 
trade union was included in the unfair labour practice definition.9 
Some members of the Industrial Court eagerly embraced the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction to the extent that some commentators labelled it 'vague 
but ultimately potent.' 10 
3 The Complete Wiehahn Report, par.3.l0 p.24 
4 Bloch, J. 'The Legislative Framework of Collective Bargaining in South Africa' 63 
S ibid 
6 Davis, op. cit. 66 
7 Wiehahn Report, op. cit. par.3.1 p.22 
8 ibid, Recommendation 4.28.5.2 p.97 
9 Rycroft, A. 'The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith' 202 
10 Thompson, C. and Benjamin, P. 'South African Labour Law' vol.l AAl-l 
I I Grogan, ibid 5 
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As a result of the unfair labour practice jurisdiction, 'bargaining relationships 
were imposed by judicial intervention.' II Even though the Industrial Court 
played an important role in establishing a 'general duty to bargain' in respect 
of representative trade unions, the Court avoided a deterministic role regarding 
bargaining levels. 12 The Court was particularly reluctant to compel bargaining 
at more than one level on the same issue.13 
It is imperative to note that the notion of 'voluntarism' did not and arguably 
still does not fully account for the nature of South African labour law and its 
context.14 
In this regard Davis notes that in a system that created statutory bargaining 
structures and provided rights for the respective parties, 'the voluntarist model 
has but limited application in South Africa.' 15 The crux of a statutory system 
was that for collective bargaining to function effectively, the parties had to 
participate in the process. 16 (emphasis added) 
With this basic understanding in mind, but without further' guidance from the 
Labour Relations Act 1956 as amended, the Industrial Court went about 
creating its duty to bargain jurisprudence. This process was however not 
without its hiccups and detractors within the Industrial Court and the academic 
community. As will be illustrated in the following chapters this tension 
persists even in the post-1995 LRA era. 
12 Horwitz, F. 'Collective Bargaining Rights in South Africa' 8 
J3 ibid 
14 Davis, op. cit., 49 
IS ibid, 63 
16 ibid 
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3.1.1 The Duty to Bargain Jurisprudence Developed by the Industrial 
Court17 
The general duty to bargain gained prominence in the · Industrial Court era 
'because many employers were reluctant to recognise black trade unions as 
legitimate representatives of their workforces.'18 
Initially some members of the Industrial Court did not favour the imposition of 
a duty to bargain while other members did. 19 However, the Appellate Division 
in NUM v. East Rand Gold & Uranium (Pty) Ltd as the 'ultimate labour 
tribunal' took the view that a duty to bargain could in certain circumstances be 
imposed. 20 It would seem that even after the enactment of the LRA 1995 and 
the 1996 Constitution the courts still hold different opinions in terms of 
whether a duty to bargain should form part of South African collective 
bargaining regime?1 
The duty to bargain in good faith had two main functions in the Industrial 
Court era, firstly it reinforced the obligation of an employer to recognise the 
bargaining agent and secondly it fostered rational, informed discussion 
therefore reducing the potential for unnecessary industrial conflict.22 
The first major bargaining case dealt with by the Industrial Court was 
Bleazard & others v. Argus Printing and Publishing Co. Ltd & others.23 
Briefly, the union, the South African Society of Journalists had for years been 
party to a non-statutory conciliation board with the employer's body. The 
union was unregistered. 
17 I am indebted to John Grogan for his succinct analysis of the Industrial Court cases. 
18 Grogan, op. cit. 24 
19 ibid, 27 
20 1991 12 III 1221 (A) 
21 As illustrated by the decisions of the High Court in the SANDU cases. 
22 Rycroft, op. cit. 203 
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The main purpose of the conciliation board was to negotiate salaries and 
working conditions for union members. The employers unilaterally decided to 
withdraw from the Board and the union sought an order directing the 
employers to remain members of the Board and negotiate bona fide with the 
union on such matters for which the Board was established. In holding for the 
union, the Court ordered the employer to resume the bargaining relationship it 
already had with the union and negotiate in good faith. 
The Court was however aware of the shortcomings of ordering a party to 
'negotiate in good faith' particularly in tenns of enforcing such an order.24 
Miles notes that the Industrial Court's concern with the enforceability of an 
order to bargain in good faith was due to two reasons: 
(a) There was no practical way in which the Court could ensure that either party 
would behavelbargain in good faith especially because there were no rules 
pertaining to good faith bargaining, 
(b) The LRA 1956 as amended did not make provision for the enforceability of 
Industrial Court orders.25 
Following Bleazard's case, the Industrial Court went on to decide another 
bargaining dispute in UAMAWU v. Fodens?6 The union alleged a total of 37 
unfair labour practices including the refusal by the company to bargain with a 
representative registered trade union. The Industrial Court built on the 
Bleazard jurisprudence and made the following statement: "One might 
infer ... that where the majority of the employees should elect to be represented 
by a registered trade union the employer could fairly be expected to deal with 
that union in connection with matters concerning the relationship with its 
employees.,,27 
2J 1983 4 ILJ 60 (IC) 
24 at 77 
25 Miles, M. 'The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith in South Africa' 2 
26 1983 4 ILJ 212 (IC) 
27 at 226 
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The Court ordered the company to commence negotiations in good faith with 
the union in regard to recognition. In addition the Court emphasised that it was 
not every recognition dispute that warranted an order to bargain. Miles calls 
this the 'case-specific' approach28 in that an order to bargain is only granted 
where the unique circumstances of the case warrant such an order being 
granted or not. 
Both Bleazard and Fodens had an immediate impact not only on the parties to 
the cases but on other . employers and unions. Thompson notes that the 
decisions had a ripple social effect.29 Many employers hostile to unions altered 
their propensity to refuse recognition as a matter of course and changed 
direction in deference to the law, also the number of recognition disputes 
altered dramatically and unions began recruiting with renewed vigour.3o 
As stated before, the Industrial Court decisions contradicted each other and 
there seemed to be no judicial consensus on the duty to bargain. In BCA WU v. 
Johnson Tiles31 the Court totally disregarded the Bleazard and Fodens 
decisions and held that it could not order the respondent company to bargain 
with the applicant union. 
A subsequent case in which the Industrial Court affirmed the duty to bargain is 
Macsteel (Pty) Ltd v. NUMSA. 32 The presiding member in this case made the 
observation that the LRA created machinery which made collective bargaining 
not only possible but compulsory. The court went on to state 'Its [the LRA] 
operation is such that, if parties negotiate genuinely and in good faith, and 
their demands and offers are reasonable, settlement will be reached before 
28 Miles, op. cit. 3 
29 Thompson, op. cit. 197 
30 ibid 
31 19856 ILJ 210 
32 1990 11 ILJ 995 (LAC) 
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disruption takes place ... with the help of the machinery provided for by the 
Act.,33 
It is imperative to note that the Industrial Court was · not per se imposing 
bargaining outcomes on the parties. This crucial point was emphasised in 
BAWU v. Umgeni Iron Works 34 'an employer is obliged to negotiate to an end 
(sic) a dispute of interest but there is no obligation on the employer to come to 
an agreement with the other party to the dispute.' 
The court therefore made a clear-cut distinction between the duty to bargain 
(which did not prescribe outcomes but had to be conducted in good faith) and 
the duty to conclude a bargain {which would have gone against the 
voluntaristic grain of the LRA and 'free' collective bargaining). 
After the Appellate Division rendered its decision affirming a duty to bargain 
in appropriate circumstances35, it seemed to be settled that 'a duty rests upon 
employers ... to negotiate with trade unions which are representative of their 
employees.'36 (emphasis added) 
One can therefore make a few observations with regard to the approach of the 
courts prior to the 1995 dispensation: 
(1) The duty to bargain rose in prominence because employers were refusing to 
recognise black trade unions for collective bargaining purposes. 
(2) The duty to bargain therefore became a tool of expediency and fairness under 
the Industrial Court's 'unfair labour practice' jurisdiction. 
(3) The duty to bargain, in terms of content, did not impose outcomes on the 
bargaining agents but brought them to the table to initiate the bargaining 
process. 
JJ at I006A-E 
J4 199011 ILl 589 (Ie) 
3S Natal Die Casting v. President, Industrial Court 1987 8 ILl 245 (AD) 
36 Grogan, op. cit. 27 
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(4) The duty to bargain as it was applied and developed was not applicable in all 
circumstances of a refusal to bargain. The Appellate Division made it clear 
that a trade union that sought recognition for collective bargaining purposes 
had to be representative of the employees in the particular bargaining unit. 
The legacy of the Industrial Court is somewhat controversial as reflected in 
this statement, ' ... while its [the Industrial Court] over-endowment could be 
seen as a virtue in the politically blighted eighties, it became a liability in the 
democratising nineties. ,37 
One would disagree with this statement particularly as the Act itself did not 
define the notion of unfair labour practices; this task was left to the Industrial 
Court whose interpretation of the phrase curbed a lot of abuse of black unions 
in particular. At the time this type of judicial interference in collective 
bargaining was necessary and well within the jurisdiction of the court. 
Thompson concedes that the SQuth African industrial relations context 
demanded the Industrial Court to 'institutionalise the escalating conflict 
[which] left it with little choice but to be robust and interventionist.'38 
3.1.2 The Content of the Duty to Bargain 
This section of the paper seeks to establish the levels and thresholds imposed 
by the Industrial Court on the bargaining relationship once it had concluded 
.-
that a duty to bargain was appropriate in the circumstances. Usually, once a 
union had established a majority presence at the plant it would present 
management with a demand for recognition.39 A bargaining relationship with 
an 'in-built' duty to bargain over terms and conditions of employment would 
then ensue with the conclusion of a recognition agreement. 
J7 Thompson and Benjamin, ibid AAI - I 
38 ibid 
39 Thompson, C. 'Borrowing and Bending: The Development of South Africa's Unfair Labour Practice 
Jurisprudence' 192 
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Failure to recognise the union for bargaining purposes precipitated a 'refusal to 
bargain' dispute which fell under the Industrial Court's 'unfair labour practice' 
jurisdiction. Although the Industrial Court was loathe to impose in particular, 
bargaining levels, topics and units, in the absence of an agreement it provided 
guidelines in this regard. 
This section therefore examines the subject under four areas: bargaining units, 
bargaining topics, bargaining levels and bargaining conduct. 
3.1.2.1 Bargaining Units 
In order for a union to access bargaining rights, its level of representativity in 
the unit had to be determined. The common approach was that in order for a 
union to be recognised for collective bargaining purposes, it had to represent at 
least 50% of the work force.4o This approach therefore confirmed the basic 
principle of majoritarianism. The Industrial Court did not always adhere to the 
principle of majoritarianism in recognition disputes; in certain cases the 
required threshold was 'sufficient' majority in the bargaining unit.41 In 
addition, the Industrial Court approved the 'all-comers' approach whereby the 
employer was obliged to bargain with any union, group of employees, and 
even individual employees.42 
One can therefore conclude that there was no single approach to the issue of 
recognition for collective bargaining purposes. Employees, as of right, had the 
right to bargain with the employer irrespective of whether they had a majority 
of the employees in the bargaining unit. It seems that even minority unions 
could compel an employer to recognise and bargain with them. 
40 Nomaqumbe v. Multi Office (Ply) Ltd 199213 IU 152 (IC) 
41 Mynwerkersunie v. African Products 1987 8lU 401 (lC) and Stocks & Stocks v. BAWU 1990 11 IU 369 (IC) 
42 NBA WU v. BB Cereals 1989 10 IU 870 and RTEA WU v. Tedelex ) 990 11 IU 1272 (IC) 
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One can also draw the conclusion that the absence of a recognition agreement 
did not prevent a union from seeking to bargain with an employer on any 
number oftopics.43 
The duty to bargain flowed whether the recognition was informal or formal.44 
3.1.2.2 Bargaining Topics 
In this regard, the Industrial Court was stricter in delineating the issues that 
unions and employers could bargain on 'employers were not obliged to 
bargain over any matters which unions [cared] to place on the table. ,45 
Whether there was a duty to bargain over a particular issue 'depended in the 
final analysis on whether the court perceived it to be a matter concerning 
which the union [could] legitimately claim to represent its members. The 
general rule is that the obligation to bargain covers all matters affecting the 
relationship between the employer and its workers. ,46 
It was however not always clear where a definite line could be drawn between 
matters where there was a clear duty to bargain and matters which legitimately 
fell under the managerial prerogative of the employer. 
The Court attempted to draw this line by distinguishing between 'mandatory 
and optional bargaining topics. ,47 However this was in exceptional 
circumstances where the court was called upon to pronounce itself on an issue 
which fell under its unfair labour practice jurisdiction. 
Generally, and most importantly, the Industrial Court confined its role to 
bringing the parties to the table and ensuring that they adhered to the tenets of 
goodfaith hargaining.48 (emphasis added) 
43 SIOCks & Slocks, op. cit. 369 
44 Grogan, ibid 30 
45 ibid, 31 
46 ibid 
47 ibid, 32 
48 ibid, 33 
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This is notion of 'bringing the parties to the table' is important in terms of 
defining the content of the duty to bargain and its inherent limits in a 
voluntaristic industrial relations system. As noted by Davis, 'in so far as the 
substance of the agreement is concerned ... collective bargaining should be free 
of intervention whether of a governmental or judicial nature. ,49 (emphasis 
added) 
One of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate that imposing a general 
duty to bargain accords with institutionalised voluntarism and that its omission 
in the LRA 1995 is unconstitutional in light of the right to engage in collective 
bargaining. As the Industrial Court rightly pointed out, the courts can never 
hope to impose bargaining outcomes on the parties. The outcome is in the final 
analysis to be decided by industrial power play. 
3.1.2.3 Bargaining Levels 
In the case of bargaining levels there was a tension between sectoral and plant-
based bargaining. Some decisions of the Industrial Court preferred plant-based 
bargaining and emphasised that sectoral bargaining was a voluntary process 
wherein the union(s) had to exercise power in order to compel the empl{)yer to 
bargain at that level. 50 
However, in MA WU v. Hart 51 the Industrial Court made the following 
statement regarding the plant versus sectoral level bargaining, '[the Court] 
does not find the two systems to be incompatible and that having regard to 
current trends in industry, bargaining at plant level ought to be encouraged as 
much as possible.' 
One can therefore conclude that the Industrial Court saw the potential 
'synergy' between the two levels of bargaining while it avoided making 
prescriptions in that regard. 
49 Davis, op. cit. 62 
50 Dunlop Tyres v. NUMSA 199011 ILJ 149 (lC) 
51 unreported 
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3.1.2.4 Bargaining Conduct 
Not only did the Industrial Court compel parties to meet at the bargaining 
table, it also insisted that the process of bargaining itself be conducted 
genuinely with the intention to compromise and reach settlement.52 
It would compromise and defeat the whole process of collective bargaining if 
parties could go through the motions without any intention whatsoever to 
honour undertakings therefore the duty to bargain of necessity involved good 
faith.53 
Industrial Court cases abound where the basic principle of good faith 
bargaining was held to be the very backbone of collective biugaining.:S4 
In MA WU v. Natal Die Casting (Ply) Ltd 55 the court listed a range of 
unacceptable bargaining tactics thus: making unreasonable proposals; the 
refusal to make concessions; dilatory tactics; the imposition of onerous or 
unreasonable conditions; the by-passing of representatives; the unreasonable 
refusal to disclose sufficient information to enable the other party to appreciate 
and discuss the issues involved. Conduct that the court frowned upon also 
included parties using abusive, derogatory and insulting language at the 
bargaining table.56 
52 Grogan, op. cit. 38 
53 ibid 
54 ERGUCo. Ltdv. NUM 198910 III 675 (LAC) 
55 19867 ILl 520 (IC) 
56 Grogan, op. cit. 46 
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3.2 The Development of the Duty to Bargain in Canada 
There are 11 provinces in Canada, all with their own statutes dealing with 
labour law and other legal matters. I will however not deal with each 
province's labour law due to space constraints; instead I will trace the 
development of collective bargaining in Canada by examining federal or 
national law. In any case, the provinces have all adopted labour legislation 
which reflects certain basic nonns as far as collective bargaining is concerned. 
The Canadian federal government began to address the plight of trade unions 
in the 1870's by enacting the Trade Unions Act. 1872 which decriminalised 
unions and enabled them to register. 57 The Criminal Law Amendment Act, 
1872 went a step further and legalized all strikes,except those which coerced 
the employer or prevented him carrying on his business.58 The momentum of 
this period oflegal reform was however interrupted by the 'long depression' of 
the mid-1870's to mid-1890's which practically nullified the gains that had 
been made by the unions.59 
These developments 'made it clear that the repeal of criminal prohibitions 
against unionism did not automatically place labour organisations on an equal 
footing with employers.'6O 
In terms of the development of collective bargaining in particular, the federal 
government enacted the Industrial Disputes Investigation Act. 1907 which 
'theoretically provided for the legitimacy of collective bargaining and the 
propriety of even-handed government intervention to assist the development of 
a permanent, bilateral relationship.'61 In practice the opposite was true, 
employers refused to bargain with unions on matters such as tenns and 
conditions of employment.62 
S7 Carter, D.D. et al 'Labour Law in Canada' 49 
S8 ibid 
S9 ibid, 50 
60 ibid 
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Collective bargaining was 'a private matter' between employers and 
employees.63 This attitude towards collective bargaining began to shift 
however after the First World War when 'the vast majority of workers 
demanded union recognition, collective bargaining and improved terms and 
conditions of employment.,64 
These efforts came to nought because the government was unwilling to 
actively intervene in employer-employee affairs.65 Instead government 
inaction resulted in a 'gross disparity of bargaining power between employers 
and employed. ,66In this type of environment, employers ignored conciliation 
efforts and made it impossible for workers to bargain collectively, 'when 
unions were formed, employers simply refused to deal with them. ,67 
During the Second World War the government responded to the increased 
demand for legislative recognition of trade unions and collective bargaining by 
'issuing exhortary regulations declaring the freedom of association and 
extolling the benefits of collective bargaining. ,68 Needless to say the 
employers were unmoved by these efforts. 
A comprehensive collective bargaining regime was adopted by the Federal 
government in the 1940's and heavily borrowed from the United State's 
National Labour Relations Act. 1935 (or the Wagner Act).69 
In this regard, the government enacted Wartime Labour Relations Regulations 
in 1944 (p.C. 1003 or Privy Council 1003), 'a set of regulations made under 
the War Measures Act. ,70 
71 ibid, 53 
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These regulations established a regime of collective bargaining which included 
bargaining unit determination and certification, unfair labour practices (which 
imposed on employers a duty to bargain in good faith with representative 
unions) and a prohibition on strikes during the currency of a collective 
agreement. ,7\ 
3.3 The Development of the Duty to Bargain in Lesotho 
Lesotho gained its independence, after being a British protectorate, in 1966. 
Despite having gained independence close to more than three decades ago, 
Fashoyin notes that Lesotho's industrial relations system remained 
underdeveloped until recently.72 . As a result, Lesotho's labour market 
institutions were for a very long time not properly developed m{)stly as a result 
of political instability, lack of democratic governance and the 'overbearing 
influence of the apartheid system in South Africa.,73 
The collective bargaining regime and other associated factors in the industrial 
relations system should therefore be evaluated in this context. In the case of 
Lesotho it is also important to bear in mind the 'small size of the industrial 
base and wage employment which may inhibit the forthrightness of public 
policy or its enforcement.,74 
During the colonial period the Master and Servant Act 1856 of the Cape 
Colony governed industrial relations as Lesotho was administered from the 
Cape.75 
12 Fashoyin, T. 'Industrial Relations in Southern Africa' 1 
73 ibid 
74 ibid, 6 
75 Lethobane, L.A. 'Freedom of Association, Trade Union Rights and Application of ILO Conventions' 
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The 1856 statute did not recognise the right of workers to form or to join trade 
unions.
76 
It is therefore safe to conclude that the 1856 statute could not have 
recognised the right to bargain collectively much less a duty to bargain. The 
1856 statute was followed by the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes 
Proclamation, 1942, which provided for the formation and registration of trade 
unions.77 
Due to Lesotho's negligible industrial development and small working 
population, the first trade unions were only registered in 1952.78 
The Trade Union and Trade Disputes Law, 11 of 1964, then repealed the 1942 
statute. This statute did not provide for a duty to bargain much less establish 
statutory support for collective bargaining, in addition there was no mention of 
freedom of association.79 
Rugege notes however that by virtue of Lesotho being a party to the 
Convention on Freedom of Association 87, the right to freedom of association 
was therefore binding on the authorities.8o 
One can deduce that in terms of collective bargaining, the conclusion of 
colJective agreements was strictly voluntary with no element of mandatorism 
to ensure participation in the process by both employers and unions. After 
independence, other labour related pieces of legislation were enacted, that is, 
The Regulation of Wages and Conditions of Employment Act 1969 which had 
minimal impact in terms of institutional ising collective bargaining. 
Molefi notes that during the late eighties in particular, one of the major causes 
of strikes in Lesotho's private sector was union recognition and negotiations.8! 
79 Rugege, S. 'Workers' Collective Rights under the Lesotho Labour Code' 932 
80 ibid 
81 Molefi, J. 'Labour Law and Industrial Relations in Lesotho: Recent Developments and Prospects'31 
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It is not difficult to see why union recognition and collective bargaining would 
cause industrial upheaval; there was hardly any provision in the legislation for 
processes and procedures that safeguarded the integrity of collective 
bargaining. 
In 1992, Lesotho overhauled its entire labour law framework and under the 
technical assistance of the ILO adopted the Labour Code Order. 1992. The 
Code's collective bargaining provisions were at best rudimentary and did not 
legislate for a duty to bargain. There were actually no provisions in the Code 
that directly promoted collective bargaining.82 The lack of collective 
bargaining machinery in Lesotho was exacerbated by 'mutual mistrust that 
[was] not conducive to collective bargaining.'83 
Rugege notes that the Code did not even provide for recognition procedures or 
for the conclusion of recognition agreements for the purposes of collective 
bargaining.84 The definition of a 'trade dispute' under the Code did not include 
the refusal to recognise a union for collective bargaining. Notwithstanding this 
state of affairs, the union could still declare a trade dispute and have the matter 
resolved under the auspices Labour Court which had the wider discretion to 
entertain 'any other matters relating to industrial relations other than trade 
disputes. ,8S 
It is doubtful whether this approach advanced the institution of collective 
bargaining in Lesotho as it did not give the parties the opportunity to thrash 
out the details of a freely concluded recognition or collective agreement. 
Instead the parties relied on interventions by the Labour Department and the 
Labour Court hence the adversarialism so evident in the system. 
82 Rugege, op. cit. 933 
83 ibid, 935 
8-4 ibid, 936 
85 Section 24(c) 
86 Section 4 
31 
In terms of developing jurisprudence or rules in relation to the content of a 
duty to bargain the Labour Court was constrained by lack of legislative 
guidance. The Labour Code and the legislation that preceded it hardly 
provided for a right to bargain coJIectively or entrenched collective bargaining. 
Although the Code provided for 'unfair labour practices' it was hardly on the 
scale of the South African Industrial Court's unfair labour practice jurisdiction. 
The Lesotho Labour Court therefore did not have room to approach co/Jective 
bargaining creatively and develop its jurisprudence primarily because the Code 
strictly defined the notion of an 'unfair labour practice' and this did not 
include the refusal to bargain. The Labour Court could however be assisted to 
a certain extent by the provision in the Labour Code which allowed it to refer 
to and apply relevant ILO Conventions and Recommendations where there 
was ambiguity and difficulty in terms of interpreting its provisions.86 
Collective bargaining in Lesotho has historically been characterised by bad 
faith bargaining including 'stalling, refusing trade union recognition and 
refusal to bargain' even where this was objectively due to the union 
concerned.8? 
Both the Trade Unions and Trade Disputes Law 1964 and the Labour Code 
1992 merely provided that employers may confer with trade union officers 
whose members are employed by such employers. Conferring or discussing is 
not the same as bargaining and imposes no obligation whatsoever on 
employers to conclude agreements or even participate in collective bargaining. 
As a result of this provision, 'employers [took] advantage of this outdated 
[provision] by refusing to recognise their employees union, let alone 
negotiating meaningfully with such a union. ,88 
87 Molefi, op. cit. 33 
88 ibid, 33 
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3.4 Conclusion 
In South Africa, the approach of the lawmakers prior to the LRA dispensation 
was to provide 'statutory support for collective bargaining without compelling 
participation in the system.'89 This form of 'abstentionism' was augmented by 
the unfair labour practice jurisdiction of the Industrial Court which held that 
there was a duty to bargain in good faith in appropriate circumstances. 
It would appear that the position, in terms of the stated voluntaristic approach 
of the LRA has not changed much from that of the Labour Relations Act 1956. 
The only difference in the present context is that the Constitution of South 
Africa, 'constitutionalises' certain labour rights such the right to engage in 
collective bargaining 90 while previously this was not the case. 
One can make the general observation that practice, especially in terms of 
judicial practice, did not always conform to the ideological base underpinning 
industrial relations in South Africa prior to the democratic dispensation. The 
Industrial Court assumed an activist role filling in the gaps in the legislation 
and utilising its unfair labour practice jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible. 
This activist role should also be examined in the context of the socio-economic 
and political situation in South Africa at the time, particularly the plight of 
black unions which had to struggle for recognition and could not always 
assume that this would extend to collective bargaining and the conclusion of 
agreements. 
Be that as it may, the stated nature of the industrial relations system at the time 
was that it was institutionalised voluntarism. Indeed the LRA is decidedly 
voluntaristic but this voluntarism clearly has its limits. 
89 Cameron, E. et al 'The New Labour Relations Act' 7 
90 Section 23(5) 
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The state and its various organs and through the various legislation including 
the Constitution has carved out a meaningful role for itself. As a result of the 
'interference' of the state in industrial relations, tensions have and do continue 
to arise particularly in terms of the role of the jUdiciary in collective 
bargaining. 
The questions that arise in this regard are: what was the intention of including 
the right to engage in collective bargaining in the Bill of Rights of the 
Constitution? Is the omission of a general duty to bargain from the LRA 
unconstitutional? What would the content of a duty to bargain be (and its 
limits) in the context of a voluntaristic system of industrial relations? Would 
the duty necessarily compel parties to conclude a bargain as opposed to 
meeting each other at the negotiating table? What role does the Labour Court 
envisage for itself in this regard particularly in terms of interpreting the rights 
contained in the Constitution in the context of the LRA? 
In a largely voluntaristic system to what extent should mandatory elements be 
allowed to dictate the manner in which collective bargaining is conducted? 
A pluralistic system of industrial relations, as discussed above, acknowledges 
that the labour-management relationship is essentially defined by conflict, 
although this does not always imply lack of common ground. For instance it is 
the aspiration of both parties that the business thrives because on a basic level 
it provides profits and jobs. The question that must inform this paper, 
especially in the recent context of globalisation and the prominence of market 
forces is how to accommodate the interests of both parties. As it is, the trade 
union numerical base is under serious threat as a result of casualisation and 
other atypical forms of employment. 
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On the other hand employers have to compete for market share on a global 
basis with countries that not only offer superior infrastructure but also 
deregulated labour markets. As a result collective bargaining issues must be 
discussed with this context in mind. 
With regard to collective bargaining in Lesotho, the legislation was 
abstentionist in terms of both the process and product of collective bargaining. 
The only form of collective interaction that the legislation allowed to take 
place between employers and trade unions were discussions or conferring on 
whatever matter that affected employees. Unfortunately, the unfair labour 
practice jurisdiction of the Labour Court was strictly defined by the Labour 
Code and did not include bad faith bargaining such as refusing to recognise a 
representative trade union and so on. The legislation was so abstentionist in 
terms of establishing a collective bargaining regime that as much as it 
recognised the legal validity of collective agreements it did little to facilitate 
their conclusion. 
In Canada a comprehensive collective bargaining regime including the duty to 
bargain good faith has characterised industrial relations since the early 1940's. 
The legislature actively intervened in collective bargaining primarily to stem 
employer abuses such as refusal to recognise representative trade unions for 
collective bargaining purposes and other instances of bad faith bargaining. 
This level of intervention by the state and its machinery in collective 
bargaining was necessitated by the prevailing climate in industrial relations at 
the time. Without some measure of compulsion to engage in collective 
bargaining most employers simply refused to deal with trade unions. 
Chapter Four 
4. The International and Regional Framework for Collective Bargaining 
This chapter examines the instruments of the regional organisations of which 
South Africa, Lesotho and Canada are members. South Africa and Lesotho are 
both members of the South African Development Community (the SADC) 
while Canada is a member state of the North America Free Trade Area (the 
NAFTA) and its labour accord the North American Agreement on Labour 
Cooperation (NAALC). 
This comparative analysis will also be done in the context of the respective 
countries' obligations under the international instruments they have ratified. 
All the countries are member states of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) however this does not presuppose uniformity in terms of their 
ratification of its various instruments. 
4.1 ILO Instruments and Collective Bargaining 
International labour standards (ILS) are primarily expressions of international 
tripartite agreement on matters relating to labour and other connected issues in 
social policy, human and civil rights. I 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) is a specialised United Nations 
agency (UN) responsible for the formulation of international labour standards. 
In addition, the ILO monitors the implementation of the ILS once a country 
has ratified a convention dealing with any labour matter. In order to ensure 
proper implementation and other connected matters, the ILO is often requested 
by various governments to render technical assistance. 
All the three countries under discussion are Member states of the ILO; 
therefore it is important to examine the ILO framework of Conventions and 
Recommendations in relation t{) c{)lIective bargaining. 
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The Constitution of the ILO requires that international labour standards be set 
with "due regard to those countries in which climatic conditions, the imperfect 
development of industrial organisation or other special circumstance make the 
industrial conditions substantially different.,,2 
Be that as it may, ILO standards have penneated and substantially altered the 
labour laws of national states in a manner that reflects the essence of these 
standards. 
There is a fundamental difference between ILO Conventions and 
. Recommendations, the former are treaties and therefore binding on the 
ratifying member state while the latter are non-binding guidelines.3 
Not all instruments emanating from the ILO have the same status, some are 
considered to be 'Fundamental ILO Conventions' (there are eight in all) others 
are termed 'Priority Conventions' (there are four) while the remaining 
instruments have been categorized into 12 categories of 'Conventions and 
Recommendations ,4 
The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention. 1949 (No. 98) 
faUs under the category of 'fundamental conventions.' Convention 98 came 
into force in August 1951. According to the ILO Governing Body, 
'fundamental conventions' are crucial to the rights of people at work 
irrespective of the levels of development of individual member states.s 
Most importantly, 'These rights are a precondition for all the others in that 
they provide for the necessary implements to strive freely for the improvement 
of individual and collective conditions ofwork.'6 
I ILO 'International Labour Standards' www.ilo.org/public/standards accessed 11111104 






In 1980, the International Labour Conference (ILC) appointed a Conference 
Committee on Collective Bargaining which ultimately led to the adoption of 
Convention (No. 154) Concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining 
1981. Convention 154 falls in neither the 'fundamental conventions' nor the 
'priority conventions' categories but one should hasten to add that this should 
not be interpreted as detracting from its importance. 
What do Convention 98 and Convention 154 provide in terms of collective 
bargaining and a duty to bargain in good faith? 
4.1.1 The Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining Convention 1949 
South Africa ratified Convention 98 on the 19 of February 1996 while Lesotho 
ratified the Convention on the 31 st of October 1966.7 Surprisingly Canada has 
not ratified Convention 98. 
I will discuss only those aspects of Convention 98 which have specific 
relevance to collective bargaining and a duty to bargain. The voluntary nature 
of collective bargaining is emphasised in Convention 98.8 To that end, states 
must ensure the adoption of measures which encourage and promote collective 
bargaining machinery with a view to regulating terms and conditions of 
employment by unions and employers.9 
Convention 98 does however allow the ratifying member states to do so with 
modifications if they so wish, without prescribing the scope of such 
modifications. to 
Nowhere in 'Convention 98 is a general duty to bargain mentioned or provided 
for, at all times the instrument emphasises the 'voluntary' nature of collective 
bargaining. All that is required in terms of state interference is the institution 
of machinery that will 'encourage' and 'promote' collective bargaining. 
7 ILO Ratifications List www.ilo.orglilolex accessed 11111104 
8 Article 4 
9 ibid 
10 Articles 9 and 10 
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The issue is therefore whether the extent of state intervention envisaged by the 
'encouragement and promotion' of collective bargaining machinery allows the 
imposition of a duty to bargain. How would a state ensure that indeed an 
employer or association of employers and a trade union or association of trade 
unions participate in the bargaining process? How would a state ensure the 
participation of both actors of collective bargaining if the machinery that it has 
created does not include a duty to bargain? Would this 'omission' not make 
nonsense of the measures to 'encourage and promote' collective bargaining 
which every ratifying state must take? Simamba notes that this very notion of 
'voluntariness has been challenged in recent years {particularly] in the form of 
restrictions such as wage controls.' II Regardless of the form they take, the 
rationale for restrictions on collective bargaining is the health of the economy · 
and the public interest. 12 
The question then becomes, should further inroads be made into the notion of 
'voluntary' collective bargaining by imposing a duty to bargain? Is the duty to 
bargain necessary and justifiable, since the notion of 'voluntary' collective 
bargaining like all other legal notions cannot be absolute? My view is that a 
duty to bargain does not adversely alter the character of collective bargaining, 
crucially; the parties are still free to conclude their agreement the above-
mentioned restrictions notwithstanding. The general duty to bargain in good 
faith ensures actual participation in the process and should not be readily 
dismissed. 
II Simamba, B.H. 'The ILO and the Right to Collective Bargaining: An African Perspective' 518 
12 ibid, 519 
13 ibid 
14 Article 8 
15 Article 7 
16 Article 5 
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4.1.2 The Collective Bargaining Convention 1981 
It is imperative to note that Convention 154 was adopted 'in the context of an 
acute and prolonged economic recession, [it] is therefore instructive to enquire 
into possible changes of attitudes towards the promotion of collective 
bargaining and the principle of voluntariness.' 13 
Convention 154 carries through the thread of 'free' collective bargaining 
established by Convention 98. The measures taken by the state to promote and 
encourage collective bargaining 'should not be so conceived or applied as to 
hamper the freedom of collective bargaining.' 14 (emphasis added) In fact, such 
measures shall be the subject of prior consultation and where possible 
agreement between the social partners. IS 
The measures adopted should in the final analysis achieve four things: 
(a) Collective bargaining should be made possible for all employers and groups of 
workers involved in economic activity. 
(b) Collective bargaining should be progressively extended to cover all matters 
stipulated in the Convention 
(c) Where there is an absence of appropriate rules and procedures for collective 
bargaining, this should not hamper the process, and 
(d) Dispute settlement procedures and bodies (voluntary) should contribute to the 
promotion of collective bargaining. 16 
Unlike Convention 98 whose approach was to state the basic principles 
without providing sufficient detail, Convention 154 to some extent stipulates 
the topics that might be the subject of negotiation between unions and 
employers or employers' organisations. 
17 Article 2 
18 Article 3 
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For instance, collective bargaining is defined as a process of negotiating terms 
and conditions of employment and relations between employer and workers 
and their organisations. I? 
However, the extension of the term 'collective bargaining' to other matters is 
also valid under the Convention where this accords with national law and 
practice. ls 
The Committee on Freedom of Association has reiterated 'the importance 
which it attaches to the principle that both employers and trade unions should 
bargain in good faith making every effort to come to an agreement.' 19 
However, the Committee has also stated that collective bargaining must, if it is 
to be effective, assume a voluntary character and not entail . recourse to 
measures of compulsion which would alter the voluntary nature of such 
bargaining.2o In fact the Committee has gone so far as to suggest that refusal to 
bargain at a particular level by an employer does not constitute infringement of 
the freedom of association? I 
4.1.3 Recommendation 16322 
The Collective Bargaining Recommendation is meant to supplement the 
Collective Bargaining Convention, 1981. The Recommendation enjoins states 
to adopt measures that ensure that representative employers' and workers' 
organisations are recognised for the purposes of collective bargaining.23 
Furthermore, it appears that once the procedures for granting recognition have 
been complied with, namely establishing representativeness, the right to 
bargain collectively follows?4 
19 International Labour Conference No. 5(1) 1980: Promotion of Collective Bargaining 
20 ibid 
21 ibid 
22 Recommendation Concerning the Promotion of Collective Bargaining 1981 
23 Article 3(a) 
24 Article 3(b) 
2S Article 4( 1) 
26 Article 4(2) 
27 Article 7 
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With respect to bargaining levels the Recommendation envisages bargaining to 
take place at the establishment, the undertaking, the branch of the activity, the 
industry, or the regional or national levels?S Where bargaining takes place at 
several levels in a particular country, there should be coordination among these 
levels?6 
The Recommendation also encourages measures that ensure that parties 
involved in collective bargaining have access to the information required for 
meaningful negotiations, including information on the economic and social 
situation of the negotiating unit and the undertaking as a whole.21 
One might therefore reasonably conclude that representative organisations, 
whether trade unions or employers' organisations, are entitled to bargain 
collectively which in turn implies a measure of compulsion to give effect to 
the right. In addition the Recommendation does not proscribe multi-level 
bargaining instead it emphasises the importance of bargaining coordination 
presumably to avoid the duplication of efforts. 
However, the main drawback of Recommendation 163 is that its status as an 
instrument that creates binding obligations is unlike that of Conventions. ILO 
member states are not obliged to implement Recommendations nor follow 
their prescriptions to the letter. Recommendations merely provide guidelines 
for the member states to follow in implementing ratified ILO Conventions. 
4.1.4 ConcJusion 
A few conclusions will suffice at this juncture. In terms of both Conventions, 
'free' collective bargaining is affirmed as a principle that must permeate all 
collective bargaining. 
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Secondly, the measures adopted to promote and encourage collective 
bargaining should not be imposed on employers, workers and their respective 
organisations without consultations but not necessarily with their agreement. 
Thirdly, the Conventions emphasise that whatever measures are adopted to 
encourage collective bargaining these should respect the notion of 'freedom of 
collective bargaining.' Fourthly, some measure of state intervention is 
anticipated and even encouraged provided the above-mentioned principles are 
respected. 
Convention 154 to some extent 'interferes' by stipulating certain minimum 
topics which must of necessity form the basis of any credible exercise of 
collective bargaining that is terms and conditions of employment and dispute 
resolution procedures. 
Would a duty to bargain in good faith fall under the category of measures that 
might be deemed contrary to the notion of 'freedom of collective bargaining' 
safeguarded in Convention l54? Provided there is judicial and legislative 
clarity as to the content and limits of a duty to bargain in good faith it would 
appear that it does not run counter to 'free' collective bargaining. Perhaps the 
Committee on Freedom of Association could have contributed to the duty to 
bargain jurisprudence by distinguishing between process and product. 
Compulsion with regards to the former would not constitute an infringement of 
'free' collective bargaining and would safeguard the integrity of the process. It 
is difficult to see how the right to engage in collective bargaining would be 
given effect without some measure of compulsion in terms of ensuring bona 
fide participation in the process. In terms of product, compulsion with regard 
to the substance of an agreement, if reached, would obviously be contrary to 
'free' collective bargaining. 
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The instruments enjoin states to ensure that collective bargaining is 'possible' 
without imposing an obligation on governments to make bargaining 
compulsory. The question that arises is how collective bargaining can take 
place without the duty to bargain in good faith. The theoretical difficulty 
however is how the duty to bargain can be reconciled with the notion of 'free' 
collective bargaining notwithstanding the interventionist inroads that have 
been made into this notion by labour policies and statutes. 
Another difficulty that arises is the issue of utilising legislation as a means of 
resolving labour disputes. Suppose an employer refuses to bargain with a trade 
union and the governing statute imposes a duty to bargain? The end result is 
that the judiciary would have to interfere and impose a 'solution' in the form 
of an order to bargain and so on. 
The ILO supervisory bodies generally disapprove of legislation as a means of 
resolving labour disputes.28 The Committee on Freedom of Association has 
pointed out that an unduly or excessively legalistic attitude on the part of either 
a government or workers is irreconcilable with the development of harmonious 
industrial relations.2~ 
The danger of a legislated duty to bargain in good faith is that it obviously 
introduces a legalistic aspect to the labour law framework, whether this is 
'undue or excessive' is open to conjecture. Empirical research would be useful 
in this regard as this would avoid making assumptions about the duty to 
bargain without the evidence to back them up. In my opinion it is clearly 
unfair for an employer to outright refuse to bargain with a representative trade 
union on terms and conditions of employment, without the aggrieved union 
having recourse to an appropriate and effective legal remedy. 
28 Simamba, op. cit. 526 
29 ibid 
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So much for the international labour law instruments and the standards laid 
down for the promotion of collective bargaining. 
4.2 Regional Labour Law and Collective Bargaining 
Regional labour law is importailt to the discussion although it is to be noted 
that regional instruments have to conform to ILO Conventions as much as 
national law does. This part of the dissertation interrogates the provisions of 
the regional instruments governing labour matters in Southern Africa and 
North America. 
4.2.1 The Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
As stated previously, both South Africa and Lesotho are SADC member states 
and have as a result of such membership incurred obligations contained in the 
SADC instruments. At present the SADC is comprised of 14 member states 
which have adopted several instruments geared towards the ultimate aim of 
regional integration, what form this integration is supposed to take remains to 
be seen. 30 
The SADC states have adopted the SADC Treaty, a Charter on Fundamental 
Social Rights, and several Declarations. 
4.2.1.1 The SADC Treaty 
The SADC Treaty was adopted in 1992 but came into force in 2001.31 The 
Treaty has minimal relevance to the issue of collective bargaining save to state 
that one of its main purposes is to foster the harmonisation of the labour laws 
of the member states.32 
30 Kalula, E. et al 'Law and Labour Market Regulation in East Asia and Southern Africa' 20 
31 Legal instruments www.sadc.int accessed 11111/04 
32 Article 5(2)(a) 
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One would venture to state that the harmonisation of labour laws in the region 
would also need to be achieved in line with the objectives of the Treaty. How 
this would shape the law in terms of collective bargaining and a general duty 
to bargain remains to be seen. 
4.2.1.2 The Charter of Fundamental Social Rights 
33 Article 2(1) 
34 Article 3 
3S Article 4 
36 Article 4(f) 
The Charter was adopted by the SADC states in 2003 with the express purpose 
of making provision for labour relations and associated matters in the region, 
and to give effect to the principle of the harmonization of labour laws 
throughout the region.33 
The Charter gives effect to the 'basic human rights' embodied, inter alia, in 
international instruments such as those of the ILO and its Constitution, 
including the Philadelphia Declaration.34 
With regard to freedom of association, the right to organize and collective 
bargaining the Charter takes its cue from the relevant Conventions of the 
ILO.35 
Organisational rights are also safeguarded in the Charter for 'representative 
unions,36 although there are no guidelines as to how such representativity 
would be determined. Presumably representativity thresholds would be the 
subject of nationally determined guidelines. The notion of representativeness 
however does suggest that the SADC member states do subscribe to the notion 
of 'majoritarianism', it is not every union that can have access to 
organisational rights or the right to bargain collectively. 
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The range of organisational rights mentioned in the Charter includes: access to 
employer premises for union purposes in accordance with agreed procedures; 
stop order facilities for union dues; election of union representatives; leave for 
union activities and disclosure of infonnation.37 
The Charter states that 'employers associations and trade unions shall have the 
right to negotiate and conclude collective agreements under the conditions laid 
down by national legislation and practice. ,38 
The nomenclature that the Charter utilizes to give expression to the 
participation of employers and unions in collective bargaining seems, from a 
literal interpretation, to be contrary to the voluntaristic nature of collective 
bargaining promoted in the ILO Conventions. 
The provision does however state that this 'right' shall be exercised in 
accordance with national law and practice. In other words where a duty to 
bargain does not accord with a jurisdiction's laws or practice, the stated laws 
would not be contrary to the Charter provisions. 
The Charter also enshrines procedures that should follow unsuccessful 
negotiation, by giving expression to the right to resort to industrial action39 and 
'traditional collective bargaining.'40 The Charter however does not define the 
meaning of 'traditional collective bargaining' save to state that the employer's 
right to have recourse to lockout procedures is also protected therein.41 
In addition the Charter states that the exercise of industrial action shall be 
consistent with the provisions of ILO instruments and other international 
laws.42 
37 Article 4(f)(i-vi) 
)8 Article 4(c) 
39 Article 4( e)(i) 
40 ibid 
41 Article 4(e)(ii) 
42 ibid 
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The observation that one can make at this juncture is that the relevant ILO 
Conventions discussed above appear to give precedence to 'voluntarism' while 
Recommendation 163 and the SADC Charter · utilise more prescriptive 
language. This approach creates problems of interpretation especially the use 
of tenns such as 'traditional collective bargaining.' 
4.2.2 The NAFT A Labour Law Regime and Collective Bargaining 
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFT A) is a regional free trade 
zone and its members are Canada, the United States and Mexico.43 The 
preamble of the NAFTA Treaty states that, inter alia, its objectives are to 
'Protect, enhance and enforce basic workers' rights,44 
NAFTA also adopted an agreement on labour in 1993 known as the North 
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) , which has various 
implications for the institution of collective bargaining in the respective 
member countries. 
4.2.2.1 The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC) 
The preamble of the NAALC places emphasis on the importance of labour-
management dialogue and cooperation and the parties resolve to enhance and 
• 4S promote It. 
Some of the stated principles of the NAALC that have specific relevance to 
collective bargaining include freedom of association and protection of the right 
to organize.46 In addition, the right to bargain collectively and the right to 
strike are also regarded as foremost in the NAALC regime.47 
43 www.nafta.org accessed 12111/04 
« ibid 
4S Preamble, NAALC www.naalc.org accessed 12111104 




Principle 2 which regulates the right to bargain collectively emphasises the 
voluntary nature of collective bargaining on matters including terms and 
conditions of employment. This is similar to the approach adopted by ILO 
Convention 154 on Collective Bargaining in terms of delineating appropriate 
bargaining subjects.48 The labour principles however have the status of 
'guiding principles' and do not have the force of law.49 To that end, the 
principles do not establish common minimum standards for the member states; 
instead they have to be interpreted in the context of each state's laws, 
regulations, procedures and practices.50 
To illustrate the limited influence of the NAALC on national labour law, 
Arthurs notes that because of Canadian constitutional constraints the NAALC 
is only applicable to Canada when a prescribed number of provinces sign on.SI 
In addition the NAALC is only applicable to industries 90% of whose 
employees work in those provinces that have acceded to the instrument.52 
The NAALC is viewed with scepticism primarily because it was adopted at the 
last minute to deflect criticism by key constituencies. The three signatory 
governments agreed at the level of general principle to respect certain basic 
labour rights, but at an operational level, only to observe their own domestic 
legal regimes.s3 
49 Annex) Labour Principles www.naalc.org accessed 12/11104 
50 ibid 
51 Arthurs, H. 'Constitutionalism and Labo~r Law' 7 
52 ibid 
53 Arthurs, H. 'The Collective Labour Law ofa Global Economy' 145 
54 Article 21 
49 
In addition, complaints by aggrieved unions, companies and individuals 
involving collective labour law matters begin and end with a minor 
investigative agency in each member state rather than' to trigger formal 
ministerial consultation which is the ultimate step prescribed for most other 
violations.54 
Arthurs concludes by stating that the NAFT A procedures 'are ultimately 
aimed at governments rather than unions or employers; they can be invoked 
only after failure of national law or administration; they have no relational 
dimension; they do not provide dispute resolving machinery or sanctions; and 
they are cumbersome and politicised. ,55 
55 Arthurs, op. cit. 146 
Chapter Five 
S. National Labour Law and Collective Bargaining: South Africa, Lesotho, 
and Canada 
This Chapter will examine the current laws regulating collective bargaining in 
South Africa, Lesotho and Canada. The interpretation given to the statutory 
provisions governing collective bargaining by the respective countries' Labour 
Courts including academic opinion will also form part of the discussion. 
According to Grossett, 'collective bargaining is fundamental to inculcating a 
culture and spirit of participation, cooperation and compromise, thus 
generating sustained economic growth.' I The discussion that will follow 
examines the legislative frameworks of South Africa, Lesotho and Canada 
bearing in mind the ultimate objective of collective bargaining. 
S.l Labour Law and Collective Bargaining in South Africa 
The provisions governing collective bargaining are contained in the Labour 
Relations Act. 1995 (LRA). The LRA's stated purpose is to give effect to and 
regulate the labour rights entrenched in the Constitution of South Africa? With 
regard to collective bargaining, the Constitution provides that 'every trade 
union, employer's organisation and employer has the right to engage in 
collective bargaining.,3 The Constitution furthermore safeguards the freedom 
of association of employers and employees and their ability to form and join 
their respective organisations.4 A limitation of this and other rights in the Bill 
of Rights must comply with the requirements stipulated in the Constitution.5 
Furthermore the LRA purports to give effect to the obligations incurred by 
South Africa as a result of its membership of the ILO.6 
I Grossett, M. 'Labour Relations in South Africa' 363 
2 Section l(a) 
3 Section 23(5) 
4 Section 23(2) and (3) 
s Section 36( 1) 
6 Section l(b) 
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In terms of collective bargaining the approach of the LRA is to provide a 
'framework within which orderly collective bargaining between unions, 
employers and their organisations can take place.7 
The LRA is to be interpreted in manner that gives effect to its primary objects 
and 'in compliance with the Constitution and South Africa's public 
international law obligations. ,8 
5.1.1 The Duty to Bargain 
Prior to the enactment of the LRA, a Legal Task Team was appointed in 1994 
to draft the Labour Relations Bil1.9 One of the issues which were problematic 
for the task team was whether or not to include a legal duty to bargain 
collectively taking into account that this duty had assisted unions to gain a 
foothold in the turbulent 1980'S.10 
Not surprisingly, the trade union movement was in favour of a legally 
enforceable duty to bargain particularly at industry level while employers were 
not in favour of such a duty, as this would introduce additional rigidities into 
the system. I I 
J Ultimately, the LRA does not contain a provision imposing a general duty to 
bargain on either employers or trade unions. lordaan notes that 'it is quite 
evident that the [LRA] vigorously pursues a policy of abstentionism in relation 
to the bargaining process and its outcome.' 12 Indeed, the LRA removes the 
bargaining process and its outcome from judicial interference and instead 
subjects the whole exercise to limited arbitral supervision. 13 
7 Section l(c) and (d) 
8 Section 3 
9 Le Roux, P.A.K. 'Organisational Rights: The Labour Relations Act 1995' 21 
10 ibid 
II ibid 
12 Jordaan, B. 'Collective Bargaining under the new Labour Relations Act' 1 
13 ibid, 3 
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The drafters of the LRA carefully narrowed down the 'unfair labour practice' 
definition to avoid giving the Labour Court free rein in the collective 
bargaining process, as was the case in the Industrial Court era. 
As discussed in the previous Chapter, the Industrial Court could order an 
employer to bargain with a representative union at enterprise level. The old 
duty to bargain was however not absolute, hence the term 'general duty to 
bargain.' 
There are two schools of thought in South Africa with regards to the general 
duty to bargain. 
The compulsionist school of thought which is gradually gaining prominence, 
asserts that the absence of a general duty to bargain in the LRA is 
unconstitutional in light of s.23 (5) which confers the 'right to engage in 
collective bargaining.' On the other hand, the voluntarist school of thought, to 
which the majority of academic and judicial opinion subscribes, asserts that a 
duty to bargain is contrary to the notion of 'voluntary' collective bargaining 
which underpins the LRA. According to this body of opinion, s.23 (5) should 
not be interpreted as 'constitutional ising' labour rights such as the 'right' to 
engage in collective bargaining. 
However Du Toit recognises that section 23(5) establishes collective 
bargaining as a fundamental right potentially enforceable as between unions 
and employers. 14 It is also argued that the LRA in any event protects existing 
bargaining relationshipsl5 and regulates or prevents bad faith bargaining. 16 
14 Du Toit, D. 'The Duty to Bargain Revisited' 5 
IS Schedule 7 item 13(2) 
16 Jordaan, op. cit. 5, citing Section 16 (disclosure ofinfonnation) S.64(4) (regulates unilateral action by 
employer) and S.5 (protection against victimisation) 
17 ibid, 6 
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The LRA's collective bargaining provisions therefore 'constitute enough of an 
incentive for [employers] to agree to establish formal bargaining 
relationships.' 17 
In addition, Le Roux suggests that the LRA is so strongly supportive of 
collective bargaining that 'the combined effects of its provisions are to provide 
a legal framework which in effect may compel bargaining by all but the most 
recalcitrant of employers.' 18 
The question still remains however how collective bargaining can take place in 
the South African industrial relations environment in the absence of a general 
duty to bargain, notwithstanding the LRA statutory support. Mischke notes 
that 'it is at first glance surprising to find that the LRA contains no general 
duty to bargain.' 19 
The ultimate consequence of this omission is that 'in principle, an employer 
may refuse to engage or bargain collectively with a trade union-irrespective of 
the numerical strength of that union or the extent to which the union represents 
employees in the employer's organisation. ,20 As shall be illustrated below, the 
refusal to bargain is not merely theoretical or academic. 
Refusal to bargain disputes are gradually becoming a prominent part of the 
collective bargaining landscape in South Africa hence concerns with the 
omission of a general duty to bargain in the LRA?l 
18 Jordaan, B. op. cit. 
19 Mischke, C. 'Organisational Rights and Collective Bargaining in Tenns of the LRA' 51 
20 ibid 
21 CCMA Statistics on Refusal to Bargain disputes{sourced directly from the CCMA) 
22 Section 1 
23 Section 23 (5) 
24 Section 8(2) 
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The omission of a general duty tobargain needs to be examined in the context 
of two factors, namely the stated purpose of the LRA to promote and protect 
collective bargaining22 and the constitutional entrenchment of the right to 
engage in collective bargaining?) Any useful analysis of collective bargaining 
provisions in South Africa has to interrogate the implications of section 23(5) 
which entrenches the 'right to engage in collective bargaining.' 
However, legislation may limit any right in the Bill of Rights to the extent that 
the limitation complies with section 36(1). Section 36(1) states that any 
limitation of a fundamental right is valid only if it meets certain stringent 
criteria; the limitation must be reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society, it should be proportional to its goal and it should be as 
least intrusive as possible. 
The question of a constitutional right to bargain is important because the South 
African Constitution applies not only vertically but horizontally as wel1.24 Du 
Toit therefore ponders the implications of the 'constitutional right to bargain 
collectively' thus: Does this mean that employers are bound by unions' 
constitutional right to bargain in the sense of being obliged to bargain when 
called upon to do so by a representative trade union? Does the Constitution 
[therefore] revive a duty to bargain essentially similar to that which the 
Industrial Court had imposed? 25 
Those who contend that a duty to bargain is incompatible with the voluntarism 
underpinning the LRA opine that the constitutional right to bargain 
collectively is ultimately irrelevant. 
25 Du Toit, op. cit. 6 
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Emphasising the voluntarism underlying collective bargaining in terms of the 
LRA, Mischke does however acknowledge that voluntarism has its limits?6 
To balance the voluntaristic scheme of the LRA, the legislature provides for 
the resolution of 'refusal to bargain' disputes and organisational rights?7 
A refusal to bargain can take various forms; other than refusal to recognise a 
union for collective bargaining purposes, the employer may withdraw 
recognition or resign from a bargaining council. 
-* In addition, disputes about appropriate bargaining levels, bargaining units and 
bargaining topics all fall under the umbrella of 'refusal to bargain' disputes?8 
In a refusal to bargain dispute, a trade union alleging refusal to bargain has to 
refer the dispute to the CCMA.29 In this type of dispute, the CCMA may 
'-l{fender what is known as an 'advisory' arbitration award.3o 
Unlike other arbitration awards that are final and binding the 'advisory' 
arbitration award is not. The effect of this award is that the employer can 
choose to ignore it without falling foul of the LRA; the advisory award 
ultimately has moral authority. 
At this stage the trade union has one choice that is to embark on industrial 
action in terms of the provisions of the LRA. Embarking on a strike does not 
imply that collective bargaining is a/ail accompli; the strike might not lead to 
the bargaining table. 
In addition, industrial action is not always the solution to sound industrial 
relations. Strikes cripple trade unions, which always face the threat of 
retrenchments and the reduction of their numerical base moreover they have to 
contend with the 'no work no pay' rule. 
26 Mischke, op. cit., 51 
27 Sections 64 and \\-22 respectively 
28 Section 64(2) 
29 Section 64 
30 Section 64 
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Employers on the other hand suffer in terms of loss of productivity, and the 
additional costs of hiring 'scab' or replacement labour. Strikes also adversely 
affect the economy and the wider societal interests. Should we rely on 
industrial action to ultimately compel bargaining or should the approach rather 
be one that seeks to avoid the pitfalls of industrial action and its effects on 
industrial relations and the economy? 
The other feature of the LRA said to mitigate the absence of a general duty to 
bargain are organisational rights. A detailed analysis of organisational rights 
goes beyond the scope of this paper however I will discuss those aspects which 
have implications for collective bargaining and the duty to bargain. 
Organisational rights enable a trade union to 'secure a foot in the door of the 
employer's organisation.'31 
The LRA confers the following range of organisational rights: trade union 
access to the workplace32, the deduction of trade union subscriptions or 
levies33, the election of trade union representatives within a workplace,34 leave 
for trade union activities35 and the disclosure of information.36 
The election of union representatives and the disclosure of information are 
only granted to majority unions while the rest of the organisational rights can 
also be accessed by unions that are 'sufficiently representative.'37 What is 
'sufficiently representative' is not defined in the LRA. However if there is a 
dispute with regard to the representativeness of a trade union the dispute must 
be resolved through arbitration.38 
31 Mischke, op. cit., 52 
32 Section 12 
33 Section 13 
34 Section 14 
35 Section 15 
36 Section 16 
37 Sections 14 and 16 
38 Section 21 (8) 
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In effect, the representativity criteria are determined by the CCMA 
Commissioners in accordance with guidelines such as avoiding the 
proliferation of unions and reducing the financial and administrative burden on 
employers in relation to more than one union.39 
The LRA is therefore governed by the majoritarianism principle and seeks to 
prevent the proliferation of unions at workplaces to the detriment of orderly 
collective bargaining. Grogan is of the view that these representativity 
thresholds are too high and might prevent unions, particularly minority unions, 
from accessing organisational rights.4o In addition, 'the size or dispersed 
nature of the workplace may lead to the union or unions finding it difficult to 
acquire the necessary level of representativeness.' 
This could prevent the union from acquiring the organisational rights it would 
normally use to negotiate collective bargaining rights with the employer.'41 
Additionally, having to recruit members from all employees within the 
workplace could make it difficult for unions to meet the representativeness 
criteria. 42 
In order for a trade union to exercise organisational rights, it must inform the 
employer of its intention to do so in writing.43 The notice must clearly state 
which of the organisational rights the union wishes to exercise, in respect of 
which workplace and the manner in which it wishes to exercise the rights.44 
39 Section 21 (8)(a) 
40 Grogan, J. 'Workplace Law' 224 
41 Le Roux, op. cit. 23 
42 ibid, 24 
43 Section 21(1) 
44 Section 21 (2) 
~s Section 21(3) 
~6 Section 21(4) 
~7 Section 23 
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In order for the union to ultimately exercise these rights it must meet with the 
employer and conclude a collective agreement to that effect.45 If no agreement 
is concluded the dispute may be referred to the CCMA for conciliation, failing 
which arbitration.46 
The organisational rights agreement is just that, an agreement to regulate the 
exercise of organisational rights by a representative trade union. This type of 
agreement should not be confused with an agreement recognising a trade union 
for collective bargaining purposes. Once the trade union has passed the hurdle 
of acquiring organisational rights it still faces the challenge of recognition and 
the establishment of a bargaining relationship. It must also be borne in mind 
that organisational rights may be terminated by the employer in terms of the 
collective agreement regulating them or by giving reasonable notice.47 
Organisational rights are presumed to ensure that a diligent trade union can 
build and maintain a 'power-base of sufficient strength [to] enable it to compel 
the employer to bargain. ,48 Ultimately bargaining with the employer on wages, 
terms and conditions of employment depends on the employer and its 
willingness to negotiate. This is the logical conclusion of the absence of a 
general duty to bargain. 
That is not to conclude that organisational rights are not important. In fact the 
provision of organisational rights in the LRA has to be · applauded because 
representative unions no longer have to embark on industrial action to access 
them. Organisational rights are therefore a 'pivotal part in the LRA's scheme 
of promoting and protecting collective bargaining.'49 However their limitation 
in terms of promoting collective bargaining should be recognised. 
~8 Mischke, op. cit. 52 
49 ibid, 60 
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As things stand, even established trade unions still face the threat of a 'refusal 
to bargain' and the possibility of industrial action in order to compel 
bargaining. 
In essence organisational rights are an instrument to enable a union to get a 
foot in the door. Organisational rights '[enhance] the possibility of the 
development of collective bargaining.'so (emphasis added) Getting a foot in 
the door is not the same as engaging in collective bargaining, is this 'foot in 
the door approach' justified particularly in terms of the Constitution? 
Le Roux suggests that the LRA is so strongly supportive of collective 
bargaining that 'the combined effect of its provisions is to provide a legal 
framework which in effect may compel bargaining by all but the most 
recalcitrant of employers. ,51 
Statistics from the Commission for Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA), a statutory labour dispute resolution agency, suggest that in fact 
organisational rights by themselves do not guarantee that collective bargaining 
will take place. A rash of 'refusal to bargain' cases have been referred to the 
CCMA despite representative or established trade unions having accessed 
organisational rights. As of November 2004, the number of 'refusal to bargain' 
disputes that have been referred to the CCMA are approximately 5450.52 In 
some cases an advisory award was rendered while in other cases a certificate 
of non-resolution was issued. In other disputes ofthis nature the parties did not 
even show up at the proceedings while in others the matter was settled.53 
so Le Roux, op. cit., 22 
SI ibid 
S2 CCMA 'Refusal to Bargain' disputes (Statistics for period 1996-2004) 
SJ ibid 
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The question that arises is therefore whether the present structure of the LRA 
in terms of collective bargaining is sufficient to make 'refusal to bargain' 
disputes the exception rather than the rule? 
5.1.2 Representativity Thresholds 
The LRA adopts strict majoritarian requirements in terms oftrade union access 
to rights within the collective bargaining framework particularly the full range 
of such rights. Whereas unions that are 'sufficiently representative' may have 
access to their members at the workplace those deemed to be representing the 
'majority' of employees at the workplace may exercise the full range of 
organisational rights.54 These representativity thresholds also apply to the 
establishment of bargaining and statutory councils.55 
~ne weakness of the LRA is that it does not establish re resentatiyity 
thresholds criteria in quantitative indicator terms. As a result what is 
'sufficiently representative')s not re~dily ascertainable; in fact the LRA leaves 
such determination to the Commissioners of the CCMA. 
- ----~. - _._ .. _-- - - - - -
The LRA allows majority unions and employers to set the representativity 
thresholds even higher if a collective agreement to that effect is concluded.56 
5.1.3 Bargaining Levels 
The LRA strives to promote bargaining at the sectoral level but without 
proscribing enterprise level bargaining.57 To this end the LRA provides for 
54 Sections 11-22 
55 infra 
56 Section 18(1) 
57 Section J(d)(ii) 
b .. ·1 58 d ·1 59 argammg councl s an statutory councl s. 
58 Sections 27-38 (including public sector bargaining councils) 
59 Sections 39-63 
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Bargaining councils are empowered to conclude collective agreements60 while 
statutory councils basically perform dispute resolution functions and may 
conclude collective agreements in that regard.61 
Du Toit notes that in practice 'many of the country's major employers have [in 
fact] entered into recognition agreements regulating bargaining obligations [at 
enterprise Jevel]'62 Webster is of the opinion that sectoral bargaining generally 
lacks coordination and is afflicted by adversarialism and sectionalism.63 ----
Centralised bargaining, although not a complete failure, has not taken off as 
anticipated. In practice, collective bargaining is still a concern of the enterprise 
due to the negative attitude of employers to centralised bargaining.64 Since 
calls for a general duty to bargain specifically relate to enterprise level 
bargaining perhaps the failure of centralised bargaining makes this more 
pertinent.65 
5.1.4 Bargaining Topics 
As much as the LRA does not provide for a general duty to bargain, there are 
however certain compulsory topics which although not direct but work out so 
in effect66: organisational rights as discussed above, picketing conduct, the 
establishment of workplace forums, retrenchments, and the discipline of union 
officials. However in terms of the most crucial topics, such as wages and 
terms and conditions of employment the LRA maintains its voluntaristic 
stance.67 
60 Section 28( 1 )(a) 
61 Section 43(1)(a) 
62 Du Toit, op. cit. 4 
63 Webster, E. and Macun, I. 'Bargaining Levels' 7 
64 ibid, 8 
65 Du Toit, op. cit. 6 
66 ibid, 5 
67 Section l(c) (i) 
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5.1.5 The Constitution and the Duty to Bargain 
As stated before, the impact of section 23(5) on the collective bargaining 
provisions of the LRA has been the subject of a vigorous debate in South 
African academia. The 'constitutionalisation' oflabour rights is a controversial 
issue 'while it is often assumed to be a positive development, it also has far 
reaching and sometimes negative implications for the development of labour 
law.'68 Some of the dangers said to arise from the constitutionalisation of 
labour rights include:69 
(1) The fact that judicial decision-making is undemocratic. 
(2) Non-specialised courts are ill-equipped to deal with labour disputes which 
involve not only legal questions, but also questions of social and economic 
policy and the weighing up of individual versus collective interests. 
(3) Judicial decision-making is inherently unpredictable and uncertain. 
(4) The decisions of the courts in constitutional matters often involve 
pronouncements on matters of socio-economic policy, which are best left for 
politicians and parliament to determine. 
Although some of these concerns may be valid, the jurisprudence established 
by the old Industrial Court in refusal to bargain disputes illustrates the fact that 
courts are mindful of their proper role in industrial relations. The Industrial 
Court intervened in collective bargaining cases only to the extent of 
safeguarding the integrity of the process and never imposed agreements on the 
parties. 
68 Jordaan, B. 'The New Constitution and Labour Law' 2 
69 ibid, 3 
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5.1.6 Recent Case Law on the Duty to Bargain 
The new Labour Court has proceeded tentatively in tenns of its involvement in 
collective bargaining disputes. The role of the court has been substantially 
whittled down by the CCMA's arbitral supervision role, that is, the advisory 
arbitration award and the dispute of right/dispute of interest categorisation. 
The Labour Court has embraced the voluntaristic stance of the new LRA and 
its strictly defined unfair labour practice regime. 
In National Police Services Union v. National Negotiating Forum70 the Court 
noted that: 
"The LRA adopts an unashamedly voluntarist approach-it does not 
prescribe to the parties who they should bargain with, what they 
should bargain about or whether they should bargain at all. In this 
regime, the Courts have no right to intervene and influence 
collectively bargained outcomes. Those outcomes must depend on 
the relative power of each party to the bargaining process." 
In ECCAWUSA & others v. Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd 71 the trade 
union argued, inter alia, that recognition included an implied duty to bargain in 
good faith. The Labour Court rejected the union's argument by holding that 
'there is no legal duty, implied by the Act, or any other law, to the effect that 
there is a duty to bargain in good faith.'72 Where a trade union has concluded a 
recognition agreement with the employer, collective bargaining is not 
guaranteed; the agreement has to specifically include this aspect. 
One can deduce that the Labour Court was detennined not to exceed its 
jurisdiction and enter the collective bargaining fray. 
Surprisingly, the High Court has entered the collective bargaining fray in the 
SANDU cases. 
70 1999 20 ILJ 1081 (LC) 
71 2000 21 ILJ 1090 (LC) 
72 at 1098 
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The judgements of Van der Westhuizen, J. and Smit, J. in the SANDU cases 
have once again raised the topicality of the duty to bargain issue in South 
African labour law. Hence the omission of the general duty to bargain is being 
revisited by certain academics and a labour courtjudge.73 
In SANDU v. Minister of Defence ,74 the proper interpretation of section 23(5) 
was examined by two High Court judges. Van der Westhuizen, 1. insisted that 
the 'right to engage in collective bargaining' is in fact not a 'right' but a 
' freedom'. The implication of holding that the 'right to engage in col1ective 
bargaining' is in fact a 'freedom' is that section 23(5) merely imposes an 
obligation on an employer not to interfere with an employee's exercise of this 
'right'. Schooling criticises this approach of the court thus 'it seems that the 
court merely examined and accepted the prevailing academic opinion on 
whether this section of the Constitution imposes a duty to bargain, without 
seeking to interpret this right itself.' 75 
In the same case but before Smit, 1. the right versus freedom argument was 
examined. Smit, J. held that the 'right to engage in collective bargaining' is in 
fact a right and not a freedom as had been suggested previously. The 
implication of this interpretation is that a 'right' in the proper sense of the 
word imposes a correlative duty on the employer to bargain. 
Since the SANDU cases involved the Minister of Defence and a military trade 
union, some academics insist that the duty to bargain is therefore only valid for 
those in the military and not private employers and employees.76 
73 Their viewpoints will be canvassed infra. 
74 2003 (3) SA 239 (T) ; 2003 24 ILJ 2101 (T) 
75 Schooling, H. 'Is There a Duty to Bargain After All?' 10 
76 Thompson, C. 'Collective Bargaining' 23 
77 ibid, 94 
71 Section 2( d) 
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5.2 Labour Law and Collective Bargaining in Canada 
Unlike the South African approach of constitutionally entrenching labour 
rights such as the right to engage in collective bargaining, Canada has no 
specific constitutional protection for collective bargaining as a whole.77 
The 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms only goes so far as to 
guarantee the right to freedom of association.78 Freedom of association as 
Archibald notes 'does not automatically require collective bargaining rights.'79 
Collective bargaining rights flow from the labour relations legislation 
promulgated by the 11 provinces.so Canadian labour law adheres to the 
principle of 'free collective bargaining' which has somehow been tempered by 
the legislative obligation on the parties to bargain in good faith and make 
'reasonable efforts' to reach an agreement.S] 
Although Canadian labour law experts emphasise that collective bargaining is 
primarily free and based on contract principles, a striking feature of the regime 
is the institution of labour relations boards. Every province has a Labour 
Relations Board or LRB (established under the Labour Relations Act 1995) 
which has the power to 'impose arbitration, order the employer to adopt or 
resile from a particular line of negotiation, or make other directions to try to 
effect an agreement. ,S2 Similarly, at federal level collective bargaining is 
regulated by the Canada Labour Code (CLC). 
79 Archibald, T. 'Canada' in 'Actors of Collective Bargaining' 95 
80 Carter, D. et al 'Labour Law in Canada' 250 
81 Archibald, T. op. cit. 100 
82 ibid 
83 Section 50 
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The preamble of the CLC recognises that Canadian labour law and policy is 
designed for the promotion and encouragement of free collective bargaining 
which fosters effective industrial relations. However, the CLC provides for a 
duty to bargain.83 
How do the Canadian authorities reconcile the notion of 'free collective 
bargaining' with the notion of a statutorily imposed duty to bargain? As shall 
be illustrated below, the two apparently contradictory notions are ultimately 
not irreconcilable. 
~The CLC provides a · specific method by which trade unions can acquire 
bargaining rights. Unlike the South African collective bargaining system of 
organisational rights and voluntary recognition procedures, the Canadian 
legislation proscribes gaining recognition by embarking on strike action.84 
All that a representative trade union has to do is to apply to a labour relations 
board for certification and provided it meets all the stipulated requirements 
shall be granted a certificate.8s The certificate gives the union exclusive 
representation of the employees in the bargaining unit and most importantly 
imposes upon the employer a corresponding obligation to bargain exclusively 
with the union.86 In order to ensure orderly collective bargaining the 
legislation imposes deadlines on the application for certifICation and 
termination thereof.87 
Where despite the granting of the certificate the employer is intransigent and 
refuses to bargain, the legislation provides for first-contract interest 
arbitration.88 
84 Carter, D. op. cit. 262 
8S These procedures are outlined in ss.24-36 of the CLC 
86 Section 50 
87 Section 24(2)(b-d) 
88 Section 80( 1) 
89 Section 80(2) 
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This first-contract arbitration is, unlike the CCMA advisory arbitration award, 
binding and effectively settles the tenus and conditions of the first collective 
agreement between the parties.89 
A union may also gain recognition and therefore collective bargaining rights 
through voluntary recognition by the employer; however most unions and 
employers prefer the certification route.90 
The actual bargaining process commences once the union serves the employer 
with a notice to bargain.91 The notice to bargain may be in relation to a first 
contract agreement or a renewal or revision of an existing collective 
agreement.92 
Once the notice has been served, the parties are under an express duty to 
bargain in good faith and to make every reasonable effort to negotiate a 
collective agreement.93 Carter notes that 'labour boards in administering the 
duty to bargain in good faith have placed far greater emphasis on the manner 
in which negotiations have been conducted than upon the content of 
negotiations. ,94 
Therefore it is evident that the labour relations boards have been and continue 
to be circumspect in tenus of distinguishing between the collective bargaining 
processes and procedures on one hand, and the product of bargaining on the 
other hand. This distinction appears to be crucial to safeguarding both the 
integrity of 'free collective bargaining' and the duty to bargain in good faith. 
90 Carter, op. cit. 262 
91 Section 48 
92 Sections 48 and 49 respectively 
93 Section 50 (a) (i-ii) 
94 Carter, op. cit. 300 
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To this end the labour relations boards have detennined the foJIowing factors 
as constituting good faith bargaining:95 
(1) The duty to meet 
(2) The duty to refrain from circumventing the bargaining agent 
(3) The duty to engage in fuJI and infonned discussions 
(4) The duty to supply infonnation 
(5) The duty to refrain from untimely use of economic sanctions 
(6) The duty to complete negotiations. 
This 'process-versus-product' approach is similar to that adopted by the South 
African Industrial Court in the heyday of the general duty to bargain in good 
faith. The various labour relations boards also have the jurisdiction to 
detennine associated matters such as appropriate bargaining units.96 Where 
good faith bargaining has been infringed the labour boards have invoked a 
wide range of remedies such as: a declaration and order to negotiate in good 
faith, in cases of illegal demands an order to remove the illegal demand from 
the bargaining table, and ordering the execution of a collective agreement 
where the illegal demand is the only outstanding issue.97 
In addition, the Labour Relations Boards (LRB's) have ordered an employer to 
agree to a union's proposal on union security to rectify breach of good faith 
bargaining, ordering reinstatement of striking employees, awarding damages 
to employees for loss of the opportunity to negotiate a collective agreement 
and awarding damages to an employer where a union has failed to negotiate in 
good faith.98 
95 ibid, pp. 300-303 
96 Section 27 of the federal legislation 
97 These remedies have been ordered by the LRB's in various collective bargaining disputes. 
98 ibid 
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It is clear from the above that the labour boards have 'a broad remedial 
mandate,99 however the Canadian courts have stressed the fact that the boards 
cannot impose a collective agreement on the parties.100 
Collective bargaining in the Canadian private sector is therefore enterprise 
based and primarily based on contract principles, although in certain sectors 
(notably construction) industry-wide collective agreements are the norm.lOt 
The nature of collective bargaining in Canada might therefore be characterised 
as 'a mix of private agreement and legislative protection.' 102 
The obvious problem with this approach is that the lines of demarcation 
between what constitutes valid intervention in the interests of safeguarding the 
integrity of the bargaining process and actually dictating the product are 
somewhat blurred. Admittedly, drawing a manageable line of demarcation 
between process and product becomes even more problematic in the context of 
a legislated duty to bargain in good faith which demands a set of remedies if it 
is to be enforceable. However the extent of third party intervention in 
collective bargaining is in the final analysis determined by the deliberate 
policy choices adopted by the executive and the legislature. 
It might therefore be argued that the Canadian system is more intrusive than 
the South African system, and as will be illustrated below the Lesotho one. In 
practice however the tribunals and courts only intervene in the process in the 
most extreme cases of bad faith bargaining such as in the important case of 
Royal Oak Mines Inc v. Canada (Labour Relations Board) 103 
99 Carter, op. cit. 306 
100 ibid 
101 Archibald, op. cit. 97 
102 ibid 103 
103 1996 1 S.C.R 369 
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In this case which involved threats and acts of violence and a long acrimonious 
strike, the Canada Labour Relations Board found the employer in breach of the 
duty to bargain and ordered it, as a remedy, to table a previous offer to the 
union that it had later withdrawn. A collective agreement was as a result 
concluded and the union called off the strike. The employer appealed to the 
Canadian Supreme Court on the basis that the Labour Relations Board lacked 
the remedial authority to order the employer to make a particular offer. The 
Supreme Court upheld the Board's remedy reasoning that while free collective 
bargaining is the norm, it is not absolute. Archibald notes that the Royal Oak 
case 'reminds us of the potentially long shadow cast by boards and courts over 
the bargaining process.' 104 
Despite the Wagnerist model of labour law and collective bargaining adopted 
by the Canadian provinces and the federal government, collective bargaining is 
said to be currently in decline in Canada with employers having more voice in 
the labour market. los This trend is mostly attributed to the inability of labour 
law to account for new modes of work or atypical forms of employment and a 
declining union numerical base which has led to 'increasing bargaining 
tensions with existing firms.' 106 
The lesson offered by the Canadian experience with regard to collective 
bargaining is that in spite of deliberate state intervention in collective 
bargaining, legislation permeated by unmistakable elements of mandatorism 
does not always guarantee meaningful or effective collective bargaining. This 
is exacerbated by the growing trend of atypical forms of employment which 
have and continue to erode trade union densities. 
104 Archibald, T. op. cit. 100 
lOS ibid, 93 
106 ibid, 94 
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5.3 Labour Law and Collective Bargaining in Lesotho 
The Labour Code Order 1992 (the Code) was amended in 1997 and 2000; 
however for purposes of this paper only the 2000 amendments are pertinent. 
The Labour Code (Amendment) Act 2000 introduced for the first time in 
Lesotho's collective bargaining regime, the concept of a duty to bargain in 
good faith. 107 
The breach of the duty to bargain in good faith is characterised as an unfair 
labour practice. lOS 
The weaknesses of section 198A of the Code have been augmented by the 
promulgation of a Code of Good Practice on Collective Bargaining by the 
Minister of Labour and Employment in 2003. The Code of Good Practice has 
various implications for collective bargaining in Lesotho. 
The explanatory notes of the Codes of Good Practice define a code of good 
practice as 'soft law' the implication being that its provisions do not impose 
any obligation on any person. However, although an employer may depart 
from the provisions of the Codes it still has to justify such departure which in 
effect creates some sort of obligation.109 The kinds of reasons that may justify 
a departure include the size of the employer and the nature and location of the 
employer's business or premises.11o 
5.3.1 The Content of the Duty to Bargain in Good Faith 
The Code of Good Practice stipulates elements of what constitutes good faith 
bargaining as follows: 
(a) The duty to bargain itself; 
--- (btThe duty to· disclose information, and 
(c) The duty of fair representation. 
107 Section 198A 
108 Section) 98A( 4) 
109 Labour Code (Codes of Good Practice) Notice 2003 at ) I 
110 Section 22(4) 
III Section 24(2) 
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The duty to bargain itself is applicable only where the employer and the trade 
union have concluded a recognition agreement for purposes of collective 
bargaining. This type of duty to bargain is compulsory post-recognition 
whereas in terms of the South African duty to bargain debate those in favour 
of compulsion would support a duty that would arise irrespective of 
recognition provided the trade union is a representative one. 
The Code emphasises that there is no duty to recognise a trade union, however 
there is an obligation to bargain with a representative one. III 
Furthermore whether the parties conclude a recognition agreement or not does 
not appear to affect the obligation to bargain with a representative trade union. 
The recognition agreement however serves to, inter alia, to formalize the 
relationship, stipulate mutually-agreed procedures, designate bargaining units, 
and stipulate bargaining topics and so on.112 
The upshot of these provisions is that there seems to be a duty to bargain but 
only with respect to representative trade unions. In addition this type of duty to 
bargain is only with respect to matters of mutual interest. I 13 
As far as minority unions are concerned, the employer is not obliged to 
recognise them for collective bargaining purposes. However where it does the 
duty to bargain will arise upon the conclusion of a recognition agreement. 
112 Section 24(2)(a-e) 
113 Section 30(1) 
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5.3.2 Bargaining Topics 
114 Section 26(1) 
The parties may bargain on any matter that legitimately forms the subject 
matter of a collective agreement, that is, matters of mutual interest. 1 14 
Matters of mutual interest include: recognition, organizational rights, terms 
and conditions of employment; technological change and restructuring in 
terms of their employment-related consequences; employment policies and 
practices; termination of employment; grievance and dispute procedures and 
'any matter that has historically been an issue that the employer has bargained 
with unions in the past.' 115 
Unfortunately there is no case law on the interpretation of either the Code as 
amended or the provisions of the Code of Good Practice: Collective 
Bargaining. Admittedly the introduction of these concepts into the Lesotho 
labour law framework is relatively recent however this does not explain why 
the Labour Court has not yet heard a matter or dispute dealing with bad faith 
bargaining or refusal of recognition where it is objectively due. Should this 
state of affairs be interpreted to mean that there are no instances of bad faith 
bargaining in Lesotho industrial relations? Are representative trade unions 
immediately granted recognition by employers to facilitate collective 
bargaining? 
In an industrial relations system that is acknowledged to be adversarial it is 
more likely that such disputes do arise but that trade unions do not pursue 
them all the way to the Directorate for Dispute Prevention Resolution (DDPR) 
or Labour Court. AnecQJltalevjden~ __ ~!!ggests J~at tra~~ ~nion~Jn ~SO!~~o __ 
not approach n~gotiatiQns_@~ ~ollective b~gaining as a core unienactivity. 
115 Section 26(5) (a) 
73 
Furthennore trade unions are more likely to represent their members on 
individual matters such as unfair dismissals before the Labour Court rather 
than to initiate collective bargaining. This could explain why the Labour Court 
or the DDPR have not dealt with such disputes, particularly in the case of the 
latter. 
5.4 Conclusion 
In the South African conte]{t the notion of 'yoluntari~m ' ap~ears ~o_ ~ ra~her 
i1l.=gefined. Rather the nature of 'voluntarism' that prevails in South Africa is 
to my mind 'regulated voluntarism' because 'voluntarism' as it was originally 
conceived in Britain has never fonned part of the South African industrial 
relations scenario. 
As much as Canada has a statutory duty to bargain enforced by the Labour 
Relations Boards and the Supreme Court, judicial intervention in the 
bargaining process has made some commentators uncomfortable. 
In the same vein academics and some members of the judiciary in South 
Africa are opposed to a statutorily imposed duty to bargain precisely because 
of the perceived undesirability of judicial intervention in the collective 
bargaining process and its outcomes. 
Chapter Six 
6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
6.1 ColI~ctive Bargaining and the Duty to Bargain in South Africa 
There are two schools of thought in South Africa with regard to a 
statutorily imposed duty to bargain in good faith. The voluntarists 
firmly oppose such a duty while on the other hand there are those who 
favour compulsion to bargain. The basis for opposing or affirming a 
duty to bargain is underpinned by both ideological and practical 
considerations. For instance, the voluntarists oppose a statutorily 
imposed duty to bargain primarily because it is contrary to principles of 
freedom of contract (and they contend freedom of association) in a free 
market economy where the proper role of the state is not to actively 
intervene in the labour-management relationship by compelling 
processes such as collective bargaining. From a practical point of view 
the voluntarists always contend that a duty to bargain in good faith 
lacks the ability to be enforceable. 
Those in favour of compulsion on the other hand contend that 
abstentionism by the state and its machinery from industrial relations 
and collective bargaining in particular fails to take into account the 
social realities of the labour-management relationship and the perpetual 
lack of 'equilibrium' characterising it. Therefore the 'compulsionists' 
argue that the state has to intervene to bring some measure of 
equilibrium to the labour-management interaction by for instance 
compelling collective bargaining. The 'compulsionists' do not 
necessarily expect the state to conclude "Collective agreements for the 
parties instead the approach is that the state must and should ensure 
actual participation in the process. Failure to reach agreement would 
therefore ultimately necessitate resort to industrial action which is also 
regulated by the LRA. 
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The debate is not only confined to academia, the judiciary itself is 
divided (not necessarily evenly) on whether or not the legislature 
should impose the duty to bargain in good faith thereby inviting the 
courts to enter the collective bargaining fray. As illustrated in the 
previous chapters, the South African labour courts and tribunals, 
beginning with the old Industrial Court with its unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction have always had diffICulty with wholly embracing the duty 
to bargain in good faith. In the Industrial Court era, the judgements of 
this tribunal in refusal to bargain disputes illustrated a division in terms 
of whether the unfair labour practice jurisdiction accommodated the 
duty to bargain in good faith. The Appellate Division eventually settled 
the issue by holding that indeed the notion of a 'general' duty to 
bargain in good faith formed part of the unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Court. Even with the judgement of the 
Appellate Division, the issue of the duty to bargain would remain a 
contentious one. 
With the advent of a new democratic order in 1994 and the adoption of 
a new Constitution the South African authorities set about reforming 
and consolidating all legislation including labour legislation. The new 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 adopted the unique 
approach of entrenching labour rights in the Bill of Rights including 
the right to engage in collective bargaining in section 23(5). On the 
other hand, the new Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 adopted a 
'voluntaristic' approach and omitted the duty to bargain in good faith. 
The LRA, despite its voluntaristic approach, does not es-chew collective 
bargaining and includes as one of its purposes the promotion of orderly 
collective bargaining through various mechanisms. Not surprisingly, 
during the negotiations preceding the adoption of the LRA and indeed 
the Constitution, the unions were in favour of a statutorily entrenched 
duty to bargain while the employers were not. Currently the LRA 
promotes collective bargaining through organisational rights for 
'sufficiently representative unions' and majority unions. In addition 
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there is the notion of an advisory arbitration award in refusal to bargain 
disputes and ultimately recognition strikes which are regulated by the 
LRA. Whether these mechanisms are sufficient in light of section 23(5) 
of the Constitution remains a matter for debate. The voluntarists 
however contend that the effect of section 23(5) is limited in terms of 
collective bargaining and that the 'constitutionalisation'of labour 
rights should be avoided, in any event, so the argument goes, there is 
no such thing as an absolute right. 
The matter, to my mind, would have been a far simpler one had there 
not been a constitutionally entrenched right to engage in collective 
bargaining. Surely this provision has to have implications for the 
institution of collective bargaining in South Africa. Arthur Chaskalson, 
the Chief Justice of South Africa stated during the inauguration of the 
new building of the Constitutional Court of South Africa that: 
"The Bill of Rights has had a profound impact on our legal order. It is 
all embracing, protecting everyone and is binding on both public and 
private actors. It is relevant to [inter alia] the interpretation of statutes." 
The Chief Justice went on to emphasise the fact that the rights 
entrenched in the Bill of Rights are not absolute in accordance with the 
limitations provision. I The limitations provision contains criteria which 
must be utilised to analyse the limitation of a right entrenched in the 
Constitution in subsequent national legislation. These criteria or factors 
include: 
(1) The nature of the right being limited. 
(2) The importance of the purpose of the limitation. 
(3) The nature and extent of the limitation. 
(4) The relation between the limitation and its purpose. 
(5) Less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
I Section 36(1) of the Constitution of South Africa 
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Chaskalson, C.J. also reiterates the principle of separation of powers 
and cautions that the proper role of the courts should always be to 
refrain from compromising the policy choices of the executive. 
However Chaskalson, C.J. states that 'whilst policy is ordinarily a 
matter for the executive or the legislature, cases do arise where state 
policy is challenged as being inconsistent with the Constitution.,2 
Indeed the crux of the duty to bargain debate is whether the omission 
of the duty from the LRA by the legislature and by implication the 
executive is consistent with section 23(5) of the Constitution. The 
Constitutional Court is empowered to declare any legislation that it 
finds to be contrary to the state's constitutional obligations to be 
invalid to the extent of its inconsistency.3 
It remains to be seen whether the Constitutional Court will declare the 
omission of the general duty to bargain from the LRA to be 
unconstitutional in light of section 23(5) thereof. The issue of a duty to 
bargain has recently been revisited in tenns of academic debate with 
the judgements handed down in the SANDU judgements. More than a 
decade later it seems that the issue of the general duty to bargain 
remains an open one in South Africa. 
6.2 Collective Bargaining and the Duty to Bargain in Lesotho 
Despite constitutional 'abstentionism' from collective bargaining and a 
history of poorly articulated collective bargaining provisions in the 
labour legislation, Lesotho has recently acquired a duty to bargain good 
faith. The Code of Good Practice: Collective Bargaining 2003 contains 
extensive provisions on what constitutes good faith bargaining. 
Traditionally Codes of Good Practice were considered to be soft law 
and not binding. 
2 Chaskalson, A. 'The Vision of the South African Constitution' 22 
3 Section 172( 1) of the Constitution 
78 
However the Lesotho Code clearly stipulates that its provisions shall be 
applied to any labour dispute by an arbitrator/conciliator and that any 
departure from its provisions has to be justified. 
6.3 Collective Bargaining and the Duty to Bargain in Canada 
The duty to bargain in good faith has long been part of Canadian labour 
law. Like Lesotho, the Canadian Charter of Rights and Constitution do 
not contain provisions entrenching the right to bargain collectively. 
The Canada Labour Relations Act 1995 which is a federal instrument 
however provides for a duty to bargain in good faith. The labour 
statutes of the 11 Canadian provinces also provide for a duty to bargain 
in good faith. The statutory duty to bargain in good faith is strictly 
regulated with procedures on how such a duty accrues and how it is 
terminated. 
6.4 Recommendations 
This dissertation focused; inter alia, on collective bargaining in South 
Africa in particular the historical development of the duty to bargain 
prior to 1995 and its omission from the new LRA and its subsequent 
'revival' in the SANDU cases. Lesotho and Canada were utilised for 
purposes of a comparative perspective. 
One would recommend that the South African authorities perhaps via 
the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) 
revisit the decision to omit the duty to bargain from the LRA. The 
jurisprudence of the old Industrial Court with regard to the duty to 
bargain needs to be re-examined bearing in mind the fact that the duty 
was applied generally and only when the circumstances of the case 
required such application. The Industrial Court, despite criticisms with 
regard to the manner in which it applied unfair labour practice 
jurisdiction, was circumspect with regard to compelling bargaining 
relationships. There is no reason why the Labour Court would not 
proceed with the same caution. 
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The number of refusal to bargain disputes being referred before the 
CCMA needs to be examined in light of the provisions of the LRA 
guaranteeing organizational rights and the constitutional right to 
engage in collective bargaining. If the collective bargaining regime set 
up by the LRA is inadequate in the face of what occurs in practice, the 
position needs to be re-examined with reference to examples from 
other jurisdictions such as Canada and Lesotho. 
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